ASX teardown: Premier Investments after the Apparel sale, what a multi-brand AU retail holding teaches a DTC founder

On 26 January 2025 Premier Investments (ASX:PMV) completed the cleanest brand-portfolio reshuffle the Australian market has seen this decade. Premier sold its five Apparel brands (Just Jeans, Jay Jays, Portmans, Dotti and Jacqui E) to Myer for roughly A$945m in mostly Myer scrip, then distributed every one of those Myer shares directly to PMV shareholders at 7.2021 MYR per 1 PMV. By year-end Premier owned no Myer stock at all and a retail business that is now just two brands: Peter Alexander and Smiggle.

This matters because the structure that came out the other side is the structure a lot of growing direct-to-consumer (DTC) operators eventually face but rarely build for: one premium brand earning a lot, one tired brand earning a little, plus a meaningful stake in a listed business (Breville, ASX:BRG) and a balance sheet that can return capital. The read for a $3-50M DTC founder is in three places: when to demerge, when to scale internationally, and how to think about a brand portfolio before you have one. What you should expect over the next 12 months is a Peter Alexander UK update, a Smiggle strategic-review outcome, and at least one more capital decision out of Premier.

What happened: the cleanest portfolio reshuffle on the ASX in five years

Premier announced the Apparel Brands transaction in June 2024 and closed it on 26 January 2025. The five brands sold (Just Jeans, Jay Jays, Portmans, Dotti, Jacqui E) generated roughly A$790m of FY24 revenue between them and had been declining for several years. The price tag was approximately A$945m total: A$863.8m in newly issued Myer scrip (890.5 million Myer shares) plus an A$82m cash contribution. You will see media headlines reference "A$1.2bn" for the deal; that figure is usually quoted including enterprise-value adjustments, while the A$945m number is the consideration that flowed to Premier itself (per Premier's FY25 Appendix 4E and Annual Financial Statements).

The unusual part is what Premier did next. Rather than hold the Myer shares as a long-term investment (the obvious move for an activist owner), Premier distributed all 890.5 million of them directly to PMV shareholders at 7.2021 MYR per 1 PMV share. The in-specie distribution ended FY25 with no Myer stake on Premier's balance sheet at all. About A$1bn of value moved from PMV to PMV shareholders in a single move, while the company kept its operating brands and its cash.

Item	Detail
Announcement date	June 2024
Completion date	26 January 2025
Brands sold	Just Jeans, Jay Jays, Portmans, Dotti, Jacqui E
Total consideration	Approximately A$945m
Consideration form	A$863.8m new Myer shares (890.5m shares) + A$82m cash contribution
In-specie distribution ratio	7.2021 MYR shares per 1 PMV share
Premier residual Myer stake post-distribution	Nil (fully passed through to PMV shareholders)
FY25 statutory NPAT (incl. gain on sale)	A$338.2m total; continuing ops NPAT A$143.9m

For an operator, the technique to notice is the in-specie distribution. Premier did not need to find a cash buyer at A$945m. It found a strategic buyer who could pay in its own scrip, then passed the scrip straight through to the people who already owned PMV. That is a capital move most founders never see modelled, and it only works because Premier had a controlling shareholder (Solomon Lew, via Century Plaza Investments, at 31.22%) with the influence to push it through.

The brand-level numbers: Peter Alexander +7.7%, Smiggle -10.7%

The two remaining brands are pulling in opposite directions, and the gap is widening.

Peter Alexander reported FY25 sales of A$548.0m, up 7.7% on FY24's A$508.6m. The growth is roughly half new-store (the UK launch in November 2024 added three London stores plus a UK e-commerce site) and half like-for-like in the existing ANZ network. Peter Alexander now represents about 67% of Premier Retail revenue and the vast majority of segment EBIT. Historical disclosures put Peter Alexander's segment EBIT margin in the high-twenties to low-thirties percent range, which is unusual for specialty retail and reflects the brand's gift-occasion sales mix and full-price discipline.

Smiggle reported FY25 global sales of A$264.2m, down 10.7% on FY24's approximately A$295.7m. This is the second consecutive year of double-digit decline. Smiggle peaked at A$319.8m in FY23, so the brand has now lost about 17% of revenue in two fiscal years. Premier closed 16 Smiggle stores in FY25 against three openings, taking the global proprietary count from 309 to 296.

The gross-margin and EBIT picture is the more important number for an operator. Premier Retail FY25 underlying EBIT was A$195.4m, down 18% from an implied FY24 base of about A$238.4m, and that is after the Apparel drag has been removed. Group gross margin came in at 65.7%, down 142 basis points on FY24. Premier blamed promotional intensity (especially in Smiggle), a softer ANZ trading environment, and UK launch costs that have not yet annualised.

Brand	FY24 sales (A$m)	FY25 sales (A$m)	YoY change	Notes
Peter Alexander	508.6	548.0	+7.7%	Record year. UK launch Nov 2024 (3 London stores + ecom).
Smiggle	~295.7	264.2	-10.7%	2nd straight year of decline. 16 stores closed FY25.
Apparel Brands	~790.7	Divested	n/a	Sold to Myer 26 Jan 2025. In-specie distribution to PMV holders.
Premier Retail total	~1,595	812.2 (cont. ops)	n/a (mix shift)	Continuing ops only post-Apparel divestment.

Why Lew demerged: capital allocation discipline most founders never apply to their own portfolio

Solomon Lew's strategic logic, set out in the 2025 Chairman's Address, was that Premier had grown into a structure that could not be valued cleanly. Five mid-tier apparel chains earning thin EBIT next to a premium specialty brand (Peter Alexander), a stationery brand (Smiggle), and a major listed-equity holding (Breville) meant the market priced PMV at a sum-of-the-parts discount no matter how the operating brands traded.

There was also a conflict-of-interest dimension that should be acknowledged neutrally: Lew is the controlling shareholder of Premier (31.22% via Century Plaza) and was simultaneously a major activist shareholder in Myer. Selling Premier's apparel brands into Myer in exchange for Myer scrip, then distributing that scrip to PMV holders, gave both shareholder bases a cleaner structure. Coverage of Lew runs hot in both directions; the structural point is the one that matters for an operator: he applied the same capital test to his own brands that activist investors apply from the outside.

The operator translation is straightforward. Most DTC founders never run a sum-of-the-parts test on their own business. They run an aggregate P&L, they look at total revenue growth, and they let the underperforming product line, sub-brand, or channel sit because closing it feels like a defeat. Premier closed five brands at once because the math said they should. That is the discipline gap.

The Smiggle problem: peak FY23, 56 net store closures, no clear product moat

Smiggle is the cautionary subplot. Two years ago it was a A$320m brand at peak. Today it is A$264m and shrinking, with management citing competitive pressure from Temu and Amazon and a softer ANZ kids-category spending environment. Premier called a strategic review during FY25 and has framed Smiggle as a "back to growth by FY27" project, which is the language a public company uses when it is not ready to commit to a fix yet.

The lesson for a DTC operator looking at Smiggle: novelty-driven product moats break when a price-disruptive competitor enters. Smiggle's positioning (colourful, branded, kid-led stationery) was originally a moat against generic stationery at Officeworks and Big W. It is not a moat against Temu shipping a similar-looking pencil case for half the price with three-week delivery. The brand asset still exists, but the product asset that earned the brand its margin no longer does.

That diagnosis matters because it shows up the same way in DTC: a brand built on "we look different and feel different" can keep its design lead for a decade, but if your unit cost is 3x what a marketplace competitor charges, the brand alone will not hold the margin forever. Premier is now choosing between investing more in Smiggle's product (range refresh, age-cohort expansion, paper-and-craft adjacencies) and managing it for cash. The review outcome should land in the FY26 result.

Retail business vs retail platform: the read for a $3-50m DTC founder

After the Apparel sale, Premier Investments is structurally different from a retailer. Look at what is on its balance sheet today.

Asset bucket	Component	Approximate value / detail
Operating brand	Peter Alexander	A$548m sales FY25; high-twenties / low-thirties % segment EBIT margin; UK rollout underway
Operating brand	Smiggle	A$264m sales FY25; net 56 stores closed since FY23 peak; strategic review in progress
Listed investment	Breville Group (ASX:BRG), ~25.5% stake	Over A$1.2bn at mid-2025 (was A$970.5m at FY24 close)
Listed investment	Myer (ASX:MYR)	Nil. Fully distributed in-specie January 2025.
Property	Owned retail and DC assets	Hundreds of A$m carried as PPE plus investment property
Capital management	FY25 distributions and dividends	~A$1bn returned via in-specie distribution; final dividend 50c per share FY25

That is not the balance sheet of a retail business. That is the balance sheet of a holding company that happens to own two brands. The Breville stake alone is worth more than Smiggle's annual revenue. The capital returned to shareholders in FY25 is more than the combined revenue of Peter Alexander and Smiggle.

Three things to take from this if you run a A$3M to A$50M DTC brand.

Run a sum-of-the-parts test on your own business every six months. Most founders run one P&L. Premier just showed you what happens when you separate a portfolio into "brands that earn their capital" and "brands that don't." Even if you only have one brand, you probably have product lines, channels, or wholesale accounts that act like sub-brands. Test them separately.

Decide what is a brand and what is an investment. Premier's Breville stake is not a brand it operates. It is capital deployed into a separate listed business that compounds independently. Most founders confuse "things we own" with "things we operate." If you have a sub-brand, a B2B side, or a property holding, ask whether it should be run as a brand or held as an investment with different reporting and different capital rules.

The cash-on-cash test beats the revenue-growth test. Apparel Brands was still doing roughly A$790m of revenue in FY24, but it was not earning enough to justify the capital tied up in it. Premier sold a A$790m-revenue business for A$945m and called the trade a win. If you would not buy your own underperforming product line at its current valuation, you should think about pruning it.

Premier Investments is structurally not a retailer anymore. It is a holding company with two operating brands, a 25.5% stake in a separate listed business worth over A$1.2bn, owned property, and a controlling shareholder who has shown he will move capital around when the math says to. Most founder-CEOs eventually grow into that mindset whether they planned to or not. The ones who get there earliest do it on purpose.

What we're watching next

Three signals to track through FY26.

The first is the Peter Alexander UK store count and unit economics. Premier has guided "up to 10 stores in the initial phase," and the FY26 result should give the first clean read on UK profitability per store. If the three London stores are unit-positive in year one, expect Premier to accelerate the rollout. If they are not, expect a slower drip. No US plan has been formally announced, so do not read US into UK signals.

The second is Smiggle's strategic-review outcome. Management has framed FY27 as the "return to growth" milestone, which puts the decision point inside the FY26 result. Expect either an investment commitment (range refresh, new categories, UK push) or a quieter cost-out path. A sale of Smiggle is less likely but cannot be ruled out given Premier's demonstrated willingness to divest.

The third is the next capital decision. Premier ended FY25 with a final dividend of 50 cents per share fully franked and a balance sheet that can fund further capital management. The most likely uses are (a) accelerated Peter Alexander international rollout, (b) a new investment alongside the Breville stake, or (c) a buyback. The Chairman's Address in December 2025 is usually where the next year's capital framework is set; watch for that.

For more on how brand portfolios and capital allocation interact, see our fractional or virtual CFO services overview and our companion teardown on the Adore Beauty FY25 result.

Sources and methodology

Premier Investments FY25 Investor Presentation (52 weeks to 26 July 2025) is the primary source for Peter Alexander FY25 sales of A$548.0m, Smiggle FY25 sales of A$264.2m, Premier Retail underlying EBIT of A$195.4m, group gross margin of 65.7%, Smiggle store-count detail, and the Peter Alexander UK launch milestones. We pulled the presentation from Premier's investor website.

Premier Investments FY25 Appendix 4E and Annual Financial Statements is the primary source for the 7.2021 in-specie distribution ratio, the 890.5 million Myer shares distributed, and the apparel divestment accounting treatment. The FY25 Annual Report confirms the post-distribution holding of zero Myer shares and the roughly 25.5% Breville stake remaining in Premier's investment segment.

Premier Investments 2025 Chairman's Address to Shareholders (December 2025) confirms the 26 January 2025 completion date for the Apparel transaction and walks through the strategic rationale for the in-specie distribution.

Secondary sources used for triangulation include Rask Media FY25 results coverage, The Nightly's FY25 reporting (statutory NPAT A$338.2m, continuing-operations profit A$143.9m, John Cheston A$5.2m clawback commentary), Aussie Corporate's Smiggle analysis (Smiggle FY23 peak of A$319.8m, 352 to 296 stores), Wikipedia's consolidation of ASX announcements (A$863.78m Myer scrip plus A$82m cash contribution), and PESTEL/Matrix BCG ownership profiles (Century Plaza Investments 31.22% PMV).

Limitations. FY21 to FY23 brand-level Peter Alexander and Smiggle revenue is partially extracted from primary sources. The FY22 and FY21 Peter Alexander figures in the chart above are best-effort estimates anchored to FY24's disclosed A$508.6m and Premier's group-revenue trend (FY21 A$1,454m, FY22 A$1,517m, FY23 A$1,663m per Investing.com). FY24 Smiggle (~A$295.7m) is reconciled from FY25's disclosed A$264.2m divided by (1 minus 10.7%); the FY24 annual report contains the exact figure but was not directly extracted in this research round. FY24 Apparel Brands revenue (~A$790.7m) is a residual: FY24 group sales A$1,595m minus disclosed Peter Alexander A$508.6m minus derived Smiggle A$295.7m. Premier does not disclose brand-level EBIT separately, so any Smiggle margin commentary above is analyst inference, not company disclosure. Peter Alexander UK profitability has not been disclosed in its first year; we have not assumed unit economics.

Want this depth of financial analysis on your own brand? That is the day-to-day work of an Australian virtual CFO.

Frequently asked questions

what did solomon lew actually sell to myer and what did premier keep?

Premier sold its five Apparel brands (Just Jeans, Jay Jays, Portmans, Dotti, Jacqui E) to Myer on 26 January 2025 for approximately A$945m: A$863.8m in new Myer shares plus an A$82m cash contribution. Premier then distributed every one of those Myer shares to PMV shareholders at 7.2021 MYR per 1 PMV, keeping zero Myer stock on the balance sheet. Premier kept Peter Alexander, Smiggle, its roughly 25.5% Breville stake, property, and cash.

why would a retail holding company demerge brands at the peak of their pricing power?

Two reasons. First, pure-play valuations: a holding company that owns five mid-tier apparel chains, a sleepwear brand, a stationery brand, and a coffee-machine stake gets penalised on a sum-of-the-parts basis because no analyst can model all of it cleanly. Stripping the apparel brands out lets the remaining business be valued as a premium specialty retailer instead of a discount-bin conglomerate. Second, capital efficiency: the apparel brands were absorbing store-network and supply-chain attention that the higher-margin brands needed.

how does peter alexander make so much more money than smiggle on less revenue elsewhere in the portfolio?

Peter Alexander is a premium specialty brand with high-twenties to low-thirties percent segment EBIT margins, gift-driven sales (pyjamas, robes, slippers), high average order value, and a customer who buys at full price. Smiggle is a kids stationery business with low average order value, daily competition from Kmart and Temu, and a store network that needs to be near schools to work. Same parent, very different unit economics.

is the peter alexander uk launch a serious global play or a defensive move?

It looks like a real test. Three London stores (Westfield London, Westfield Stratford, Bluewater) plus a UK e-commerce site launched in November 2024, with up to 10 stores planned in the initial phase. Premier has not disclosed unit economics for the UK stores in their first year, so we will not know if the model travels until the FY26 update. No US rollout has been formally announced as of mid-2026.

what does the smiggle decline tell me about kids stationery and temu?

It tells you that a brand built on novelty and impulse-buy moments at a A$5 to A$25 price point is exposed when a competitor (Temu, Amazon, Kmart) can offer the same novelty at half the price with similar enough quality. Smiggle peaked at A$319.8m revenue in FY23 and has lost 17% of revenue in two years while closing 56 stores. The product moat was always weaker than the brand moat, and Temu is now testing the brand moat.

should a $20m dtc brand think of itself as a brand or a portfolio?

Both, eventually. The first A$10m to A$20m is a single-brand grind because you do not have the cash or attention to spread. Past A$20m, founders who never think about portfolio structure end up running three brands inside one P&L (their core, a sub-brand, a wholesale account) without ever measuring which one is earning its capital. The Premier teardown is the cleanest example you'll see of asking that question and acting on the answer.

when does it make sense to sell a brand instead of grinding on a turnaround?

When the brand has stopped earning its cost of capital, the strategic review has not produced a credible thesis for return to growth within 24 months, and the buyer pool is real. Premier did exactly this with the Apparel brands: declining segment EBIT, no return-to-growth thesis, and a strategic buyer (Myer) who could absorb the supply chain. If two of those three are missing, you grind. If all three are present, you sell.

what is the difference between a retail business and a retail platform?

A retail business owns brands and sells products. A retail platform owns brands AND holds capital deployed across other listed equity, property, and cash, with a disciplined view on when to redeploy. Premier post-Apparel is the second thing: two operating brands (Peter Alexander, Smiggle), a roughly 25.5% Breville stake, owned property, and ~A$1bn returned to shareholders in FY25. The platform mindset is what most founder-CEOs eventually grow into.