The 10 Largest Public DTC Brands by Revenue 2026

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Executive summary: The 10 largest publicly-traded DTC and CPG brands by 2026 revenue range from Lululemon ($11.1B) to Oddity ($810M). Operating margins span +26.2% (Birkenstock) to -5.0% (Funko), so scale alone is not the moat. Three of the ten print revenue without operating profit. Distribution depth, gross margin floor, and SG&A leverage separate winners.

Most DTC and CPG founders build benchmarks the wrong way. They scan headlines, average a few competitor revenue numbers, and build a "we want to be here in 3 years" wishlist with no relationship to the operating model required to get there. Public companies file 10-Ks. The 10-K tells you exactly what a $1B+ DTC operator looks like — gross margin, operating margin, marketing intensity, working capital. Most founders never read one.

This post ranks the 10 largest publicly-traded DTC and CPG brands by 2026 revenue using SEC EDGAR data. The brief: what does scale actually look like, where does the operating model break, and how should a $20M-$150M private brand read this data?

I had a company that was doing 80 million and they had made 16 months in a row of profit and they still couldn't find the capital that they wanted. That's the gap between revenue and operating leverage. Print revenue, sure. But the public companies in this list show what it actually takes to print operating income at scale — and how few brands clear that bar.

Why are public DTC brand revenues a useful benchmark?

Public companies file standardized financial statements. The numbers are audited, comparable, and lagging — but real. For a private DTC or CPG brand planning against scale, public filings are the only data set that doesn't lie about itself.

• Scale changes the operating model. A $20M private DTC brand has 35-50% G&A as a percentage of revenue. A $1B+ public brand runs 15-25%. The reduction is not from cost-cutting; it's from leverage on fixed costs as revenue grows.
• Public margins are floor, not ceiling. The public median (4.5% operating margin per our DTC operating margin benchmark) drags down because public brands carry SOX, IR, and equity-comp expense. Private brands $5M-$150M typically run 8-15% operating margin.
• Revenue ≠ moat. Three of the top 10 brands by revenue in this cohort are unprofitable. Scale alone is not strategy. The brands that print operating income at scale share a small set of disciplines.

The ranked table: top 10 public DTC and CPG brands by 2026 revenue

Source: SEC EDGAR 10-K and 10-Q filings via the Eightx benchmark content pipeline. Fiscal year is the most recent reporting period available. Operating margin is as-reported; CCC = inventory days + DSO − DPO. Non-2026 fiscal years are noted.

#	Company (ticker)	Revenue (latest FY)	Operating margin	Gross margin	CCC (days)
1	Lululemon (LULU)	$11.10B (FY2025)	+19.9%	56.6%	n/a
2	Celsius (CELH)	$2.52B (FY2025)	+5.6%	50.4%	n/a
3	Birkenstock (BIRK)	~$2.31B (FY2025)	+26.2%	59.1%	n/a
4	Yeti (YETI)	$1.87B (FY2025)	+11.4%	57.4%	96.6
5	e.l.f. Beauty (ELF)	$1.64B (FY2026)	+4.5%	70.7%	n/a
6	Stitch Fix (SFIX)	$1.27B (FY2025)	−3.1%	44.4%	n/a
7	Revolve (RVLV)	$1.23B (FY2025)	+6.1%	53.5%	130.1
8	Funko (FNKO)	$908M (FY2025)	−5.0%	38.7%	55.8
9	Warby Parker (WRBY)	$872M (FY2025)	−0.6%	54.0%	12.8
10	Oddity Tech (ODD)	$810M (FY2025)	+14.7%	72.7%	n/a

Revenue and margins are from each company's most recent 10-K (or 20-F for Birkenstock and Oddity) on SEC EDGAR, refreshed July 2026. Birkenstock reports in euros under IFRS; the ~$2.31B is converted at its fiscal-year average rate. Just below the top 10: Vital Farms ($759M), FIGS ($631M), Olaplex ($423M), Bark ($395M). On Holding files as a foreign private issuer and would rank near the top on revenue (~$2.7B) but is not yet in our SEC pull.

Two takeaways before per-brand detail. First, revenue is highly skewed: Lululemon at $11.1B is roughly 4.4x the second-place finisher. Second, operating margin doesn't track revenue. Birkenstock (26.2% OpM) and Yeti ($1.87B, +11.4% OpM) are far more profitable than Stitch Fix ($1.27B, -3.1% OpM) or Funko ($908M, -5.0% OpM), and three of the top 10 are unprofitable on operating income.

The brands: revenue, founding, and operating model

Lululemon: $11.10B (FY2025)

Founded 1998 in Vancouver by Chip Wilson. Premium athletic apparel that pioneered the technical-fabric-as-lifestyle category before "athleisure" existed. The only brand in this cohort operating at true global retail scale, with corporate stores across North America, Europe, China, and ANZ — most volume is direct retail, not pure ecommerce.

Operating model: 56.6% gross margin (mid-pack), 19.9% operating margin (top of cohort by 7+ points), and just 5.6% sales & marketing as a percentage of revenue. Most DTC brands run 15-30% S&M; Lululemon's brand pull is strong enough that it doesn't need paid acquisition at that rate. Combined with 36.6% SG&A — efficient given the global retail footprint — the result is operating leverage no other brand in this cohort comes close to. Lululemon is closer to a luxury operator than a typical DTC brand.

Yeti: $1.87B (FY2025)

Founded 2006 in Austin, Texas, by Roy and Ryan Seiders. The case study for taking a commodity category (coolers) and pricing it like luxury through brand and engineering. Operating model: 57.4% gross margin, 11.4% operating margin, 96.6-day CCC. Sales & marketing at 7.8% — unusually low — because distribution is largely wholesale (Bass Pro, Dick's, REI) plus DTC. The wholesale channel does the customer-acquisition lift. Yeti shows a hybrid wholesale-plus-DTC model with strong brand produces healthier operating margins than pure-DTC peers running 15-25% S&M.

Celsius: $2.52B (FY2025)

Founded 2004 in Florida; the current scaling era began with the 2022 PepsiCo distribution agreement that took Celsius from a niche functional-beverage brand to a top-three US energy drink, and the 2025 acquisition of Alani Nu roughly doubled the platform. Operating model: 50.4% gross margin and a 5.6% operating margin on $2.52B of FY2025 revenue. Revenue nearly doubled year over year, but the operating margin compressed from the mid-teens as acquisition, integration, and PepsiCo distribution economics flowed through. This is what scaling a beverage brand through a strategic distributor and a large acquisition looks like: revenue leaps, margin digests.

e.l.f. Beauty: $1.64B (FY2026)

Founded 2004 by Joseph Shamah and Scott Vincent Borba as Eyes Lips Face, a value-tier beauty brand sold initially online for $1 per item. Became a public-market darling on TikTok-driven distribution and an aggressive influencer engine. Operating model: 70.7% gross margin (among the highest in the cohort), 21.4% S&M (the highest in the cohort, by design), and a 4.5% operating margin in FY2026, compressed by amortization from the rhode acquisition rather than by weak unit economics. e.l.f.'s thesis: spend aggressively on the funnel, let the gross margin absorb it, grow into operating leverage. The modern beauty CPG playbook, mid-acquisition.

Stitch Fix: $1.27B (FY2025)

Founded 2011 by Katrina Lake. Personalized apparel subscription. The cautionary tale of the cohort: revenue peaked near $2.1B in FY2021 and has declined for several years since, landing at $1.27B in FY2025 with the operating margin still negative. Operating model: 44.4% gross margin, -3.1% operating margin. Thin gross margin (apparel inventory-heavy, returns-heavy) combined with high fulfillment intensity meant Stitch Fix never converted scale into durable operating leverage. If your gross margin can't absorb the marketing and fulfillment intensity required to scale, scale will not save you.

Revolve: $1.23B (FY2025)

Founded 2003 by Mike Karanikolas and Michael Mente. Online apparel retailer that pioneered the influencer-led merchandising model — Coachella trips, brand activations, then converting attention into mid-to-premium apparel sales. Operating model: 53.5% gross margin, 6.1% operating margin, 14.3% S&M, 130.1-day CCC. The apparel DTC mid-case: real operating margin (unlike Stitch Fix) but well below the beauty/outdoor leaders because apparel gross margin and returns drag profitability.

Funko: $908M (FY2025)

Founded 1998. Pop-culture collectibles sold through DTC, mass retail (Target, Walmart), and licensing deals with film, TV, and gaming IP holders. Operating model: -5.0% operating margin, 37.2% SG&A, 55.8-day CCC. Licensing fees compress gross margin; collectibles is exposed to taste cycles. Scale without category resilience produces volatile profitability.

Warby Parker: $872M (FY2025)

Founded 2010 by Neil Blumenthal, Andrew Hunt, David Gilboa, and Jeffrey Raider. The original "DNVB" case study — DTC eyewear sold initially online, now through 200+ retail stores. Operating model: 54.0% gross margin, -0.6% operating margin (essentially break-even), 54.6% SG&A. The standout metric is a 12.8-day cash conversion cycle — by far the lowest in the cohort, because eyewear is inventory-light and Warby manufactures-to-prescription. Warby is the operational example of how to run almost zero working capital drag at scale. What it hasn't yet solved is SG&A leverage as it builds physical retail.

Vital Farms: $759M (FY2025)

Founded 2007 by Matt and Catherine O'Hayer in Austin, Texas. Pasture-raised eggs and dairy sold predominantly through grocery (Whole Foods, Kroger, Target). Operating model: 37.6% gross margin (structurally low — eggs are commodity-adjacent), 11.6% operating margin, 41.3-day CCC. Vital Farms shows a CPG brand with thinner gross margin can still print healthy operating profit when distribution is efficient (grocery wholesale) and a price premium anchors the gross-margin floor. CCC is short because eggs are perishable.

Bark Inc.: $395M (FY2026), just below the top 10

Founded 2011, BarkBox subscription service for dog products. Operating model: 61.3% gross margin (healthy), -10.2% operating margin (unhealthy), and revenue that fell from $484M (FY2025) to $395M (FY2026). Classic DTC subscription challenge: customer acquisition cost climbs as the easy demographic saturates, retention compresses, and the brand layers additional revenue streams (Bark Air, retail) carrying their own working-capital cost. Revenue shrinking while still unprofitable on operating income illustrates that scale is not a destination: it's a liability if the unit economics don't tighten.

Birkenstock: ~$2.31B (FY2025)

Founded in Germany in 1774; IPO'd on the NYSE in 2023 (ticker BIRK). Files as a foreign private issuer, reporting in euros under IFRS (revenue EUR 2,097.4M, roughly $2.31B at its fiscal-year average rate). Operating model: 59.1% gross margin and a 26.2% operating margin, the highest in the entire cohort, on the back of owned German manufacturing, deliberate scarcity, and premium pricing across a narrow, iconic product line. Birkenstock is the clearest proof in this set that a heritage brand with pricing power and disciplined distribution out-earns every high-growth DTC operator on margin.

Oddity Tech: $810M (FY2025)

Parent of IL MAKIAGE and SpoiledChild; IPO'd in 2023 (ticker ODD), files a 20-F as a foreign private issuer. Operating model: 72.7% gross margin (the highest in the cohort) and a 14.7% operating margin, built on an online-only, data-and-quiz-driven acquisition model that replaces retail sampling with algorithmic matching. Oddity is the counter-example to "pure DTC can't scale profitably": high gross margin plus a proprietary acquisition engine produces both growth and operating profit.

Cohort members just below the top 10, and one still to fold in

Vital Farms ($759M, +11.6% operating margin) and Bark ($395M) sit just outside the top 10 on the latest data. On Holding (ONON) files as a foreign private issuer and reports revenue around $2.7B, which would place it near the top of this list; it is not yet in our SEC pull and will be folded into the next refresh.

What changes between $100M and $1B+? The patterns at scale

Looking across the 10 brands, there are five repeating patterns that distinguish the $1B+ operators with healthy operating margin from the rest of the cohort.

1. Gross margin north of 55% as the foundation

Every brand in the cohort with positive operating margin (Lululemon, Yeti, Celsius, e.l.f., Vital Farms, Revolve) had a structural way to defend gross margin — premium positioning, low input cost, distributor relationships, or proprietary product. Stitch Fix and Bark show thin gross margin compounds badly at scale. The gross margin floor matters more at $1B than at $50M.

2. Marketing intensity calibrated to gross margin headroom

e.l.f. spends 21.4% on S&M and still prints operating profit (4.5% in FY2026, compressed by acquisition amortization) because a 70.7% gross margin absorbs the spend. Yeti spends 7.8% because wholesale does the acquisition lift. Lululemon spends 5.6% because brand pull does the work. The right S&M intensity depends on what your gross margin can absorb — there is no universal "right" number.

3. SG&A leverage from $500M onward

SG&A runs in a tight band for the healthy operators: Lululemon 36.6%, Yeti 46.0%, Vital Farms 21.0%. At $20M revenue, most private brands run 35-50% SG&A. The leverage isn't from cost-cutting; it's from holding overhead growth below revenue growth as scale arrives. A discipline question: did you hire ahead of revenue or in line with it?

4. Wholesale or distribution as the volume engine

Pure DTC brands struggle to hit $1B+ in this data set. Yeti is wholesale-anchored. Lululemon is owned-retail-anchored. Celsius rides PepsiCo distribution. Vital Farms is grocery-anchored. e.l.f. is mass retail. Pure-DTC scaling to $1B+ is "more or less dead except for super-wealthy founders" — that's the ecommerce M&A consensus across recent industry market reports. Brands that scale past $500M almost always layer wholesale, retail, or platform distribution.

5. Cash conversion cycle becomes strategic, not accounting

The CCC range across this cohort is wide, from 12.8 days (Warby) to well over 140 days for the beauty CPG brands (e.l.f., Olaplex). It tells you how each business is funded: Warby self-funds growth; inventory-heavy CPG brands need more working capital, a credit line, or a distributor relationship to scale. Your CCC determines whether you can grow on internal cash or need a credit line, factoring, or equity. Answer the CCC question before you set the growth target.

What does this mean for $5M-$150M private brands?

The right way to read public benchmarks is as directional context, not as targets to hit. Three specific implications for the $5M-$150M private brands we work with:

You don't have to look like the public companies — and you shouldn't.

Most private brands $5M-$50M run 8-15% operating margin, better than the public median of 4.5%, because they don't carry public-company overhead (SOX, IR, equity comp, board governance). The public median drags down because it absorbs costs your brand doesn't have. Compare yourself to private peers in the DTC operating margin benchmark, not to a public median measuring something different.

The disciplines are the same; the numbers are different.

Gross margin floor, marketing intensity calibrated to that floor, contribution margin per channel, cash conversion cycle, payback period — these are the same disciplines whether you're $20M or $2B. Lululemon and a $20M private brand both have to answer "what is contribution margin per unit" and "how many days does cash sit in inventory." The answers differ; the questions don't. (For ecommerce brands operating internationally, see global expansion financial strategy.)

If you're targeting $1B+, design the operating model now.

The brands that arrive at $1B+ with healthy operating margin (e.l.f., Lululemon, Yeti, Vital Farms) didn't pivot to operating discipline at $500M. They built it from $20M-$50M onward — gross margin floor, marketing budgets that respected unit economics, SG&A growth held below revenue growth. The brands that didn't (Stitch Fix, Bark, Funko) hit scale and found the operating model didn't compose. You can't rebuild operating discipline at $300M. You either built it on the way up, or you didn't.

I had two clients in the $70M and $100M range. The $70M company eventually built out a 10-person finance team because they had 250 people across 10 departments — the complexity drove the headcount. The $100M company has been with us almost two years, and I don't see them hiring full time for maybe another year. Same revenue range, different operating models. Scale is a function of complexity, not just revenue.

Should you compare your brand to public DTC companies?

Comparing a $30M private brand to Lululemon is cosplay. Comparing it to Vital Farms is more useful. Comparing it to Yeti at the same revenue point Yeti was at pre-IPO (~$120M in 2014) is even more useful — but that data isn't in 10-Ks.

The right benchmark for a $5M-$150M brand is the private-brand cohort, supplemented by the operating-model patterns from public data. The 10 public brands tell you what the destination looks like and which disciplines compound on the way — not what to be at $30M. We maintain both views in the operating margin benchmark and top-margin DTC analysis.

Frequently Asked Questions

Which public DTC brand has the highest revenue in 2026?

Lululemon leads all publicly-traded DTC and CPG brands at $11.1 billion in fiscal 2025 revenue, roughly 4.4x the next-largest brand in the cohort (Celsius at $2.52B). Lululemon is also the only brand in the cohort generating a 19.9% operating margin at scale, which is closer to a luxury operator than a typical DTC or CPG profile.

What is the average revenue of public DTC brands?

Across the 15 publicly-traded DTC and CPG brands in our SEC EDGAR cohort with reported revenue, the median is around $872 million and the mean is approximately $1.7 billion (skewed heavily by Lululemon's $11.1B). Most public DTC brands sit in the $300M-$1.5B band; only one (Lululemon) has cleared $10B. The cohort spans Lululemon, Celsius, Birkenstock, Yeti, e.l.f., Stitch Fix, Revolve, Funko, Warby Parker, Oddity, Vital Farms, FIGS, Olaplex, Bark, Honest Co, Beauty Health, and Beyond Meat.

What separates a $1B+ DTC brand from a $100M one?

Three things: distribution depth (wholesale and international, not just DTC), G&A leverage (15-25% of revenue at scale vs 35-50% at $100M), and category position (gross margin north of 55% on a defensible product). Lululemon, e.l.f., Yeti, Celsius, and Vital Farms all share these traits. Brands stuck below $1B typically have one of the three but not all three.

How do public DTC brand benchmarks apply to a $20M private brand?

Public benchmarks are useful for direction, not absolute targets. A $20M private DTC brand will not have Lululemon's G&A leverage — fixed costs are higher as a percentage of revenue at smaller scale. But the disciplines (gross margin floor, marketing as a percentage of revenue, cash conversion cycle, contribution margin per unit) are the same disciplines. Most $5M-$50M private brands we work with run healthy at 8-15% operating margin — better than the public median of 4.5%, because they don't carry public-company overhead. The lesson from public data is what the operating model looks like at scale, not what your numbers should be today.

What is the cash conversion cycle pattern across public DTC brands?

Cash conversion cycle (CCC) varies dramatically by category. Warby Parker runs at 12.8 days (lowest in the cohort) thanks to inventory-light eyewear distribution. Yeti is at 96.6 days. Beauty CPG brands (e.l.f. at 146 days, Olaplex at 172 days) run heavy because of long retail lead times. Inventory days drive most of the variance: median around 130 days for the cohort. Smaller private brands typically run tighter inventory but worse payable terms.

Sources & methodology

Revenue and margin figures are drawn from each company's SEC filings on EDGAR. Each row uses the fiscal year labeled in the table, which for a few brands is not the most recent filing; treat this as a labeled point-in-time cohort rather than a live ranking. Operating-margin medians and the cohort selection are Eightx aggregations.

1. SEC EDGAR filings for the ranked cohort (10-K, or 20-F for foreign private issuers), refreshed July 2026: Lululemon (CIK 1397187), Celsius (1341766), Birkenstock (1977102, 20-F), YETI (1670592), e.l.f. Beauty (1600033), Stitch Fix (1576942), Revolve (1746618), Funko (1704711), Warby Parker (1504776), Oddity Tech (1907085, 20-F), Vital Farms (1579733), FIGS (1846576), Olaplex (1868726), Bark (1819574). Lululemon 10-K · YETI 10-K · Celsius 10-K · Revolve 10-K
2. Meridian Investment Banking, "DTC Ecommerce M&A Market Update Fall 2024" (the "pure-DTC scaling to $1B+ is more or less dead" framing).
3. Eightx aggregations: Operating margin benchmarks: public DTC brands 2026 and Top 5 operating margin DTC brands 2026. The 4.5% median operating margin, the cohort selection, and the cash-conversion-cycle figures are Eightx-computed from the filings above.