Hims & Hers (HIMS) Teardown: Numbers, Model, Bear Case

$586 million of revenue in Q1 2025. $608 million twelve months later. That 3.8% growth is the number that breaks the Hims & Hers story open - not because it is catastrophic, but because twelve months earlier the company was growing at 59% and posting a 73.5% gross margin. In Q1 2026 that margin sits at 65.2% and the business posted a $92.1M net loss. The change did not come from the subscription model falling apart. It came from a regulatory door closing exactly when the business had grown dependent on it staying open.

This is the teardown of a genuinely good business with a genuinely dangerous concentration. The 73.8% gross margin and $300M operating cash flow are real. The question is what happens when the $725M of compounded-GLP-1 revenue that got you there is no longer legal to offer at scale.

Section 1 - The snapshot

Metric	FY2025	Q1 2026 (crack)	Q1 2025 (prior year)
Revenue	$2,347.6M	$608.1M	$586.0M
Revenue YoY	+59%	+3.8%	n/a
Gross margin	73.8%	65.2%	73.5%
Operating income (loss)	$105.6M (4.5%)	-$78.3M (-12.9%)	$57.9M (9.9%)
Net income (loss)	$128.4M	-$92.1M	$49.5M
Diluted EPS	$0.51	-$0.40	$0.20
Operating cash flow	$300.0M	$89.4M (YTD)	n/a
Subscribers	2,511,000	2,584,000	2,366,000
Cash + investments	$928.8M	$750.9M	n/a
Convertible notes (net)	$972.6M	$974.1M	none

The five-year arc in a second table:

Fiscal year	Revenue	YoY growth	Gross margin	Operating margin	Operating cash flow
FY2021 (SPAC year)	$271.9M	+83%	75.2%	-42.3%	-$34.4M
FY2022	$526.9M	+93.8%	77.6%	-13.0%	-$26.5M
FY2023	$872.0M	+65.5%	82.0%	-3.4%	+$73.5M
FY2024	$1,476.5M	+69.3%	79.5%	+4.2%	+$251.1M
FY2025	$2,347.6M	+59.0%	73.8%	+4.5%	+$300.0M

Section 2 - The business model: how they actually make money

Hims & Hers is not a drug company and not a pharmacy in the traditional sense. It is a telehealth platform that connects consumers directly to licensed healthcare providers, then fulfils the resulting prescriptions - mostly through its own pharmacies. That structural decision is where the gross margin comes from.

The model has four interlocking pieces. First, a consumer signs up at hims.com or hers.com for a condition-specific product: erectile dysfunction, hair loss, a skincare treatment, mental health support, or weight management. Second, an affiliated licensed provider reviews the intake questionnaire and issues a prescription if appropriate. Third, that prescription is filled by one of HIMS's wholly-owned pharmacies - XeCare LLC in New Albany, Ohio (~300,000 sq ft) or Apostrophe Pharmacy LLC in Arizona - and shipped directly. Fourth, the customer is billed on a recurring subscription cadence: 30 days to 360 days depending on the product. Most revenue is subscription-based and online; wholesale (non-prescription products in retail stores) is less than 2% of revenue.

The owned-pharmacy element is what separates the economics from a marketplace. When a third-party pharmacy fulfils a prescription, the platform company earns a referral fee or a thin margin. When HIMS fills it internally, the platform captures the dispensing margin directly. That is the mechanism behind the 82% gross margin HIMS achieved in FY2023 - the highest in company history and one of the highest in consumer health.

The customer base, as of end-FY2025, is 2,511,000 subscribers paying an average of $83 per month in revenue. Total online revenue was $2,311M, or 98.5% of the total. Wholesale is declining in absolute dollars - HIMS has deliberately deprioritised retail shelf space. The platform runs the Hims brand for men and the Hers brand for women, across sexual health, hair loss, hormone health, weight loss, dermatology, and mental health. The Hers brand grew triple-digit YoY in FY2025 and accounted for nearly 40% of U.S. revenue by the end of the year.

One mechanic that most overviews skip: the corporate practice of medicine prohibition in most U.S. states means HIMS cannot directly employ physicians. Instead it contracts with independent Affiliated Medical Groups - physician-owned professional corporations - under 10-year administrative services agreements. The pharmacies are held as Variable Interest Entities and consolidated into the financials. This structure adds legal complexity; it is also specifically flagged as a risk every year the company files a 10-K.

Here is what a real-money customer journey looks like as UGC. These three TikToks are sentiment signals, not load-bearing facts - but they illustrate what the subscription engine looks like from the user side.

@jcraft

@hims you should really be paying me for this. #hairloss #hairlossremedy #hairgrowth

♬ original sound - jared craft

@jcraft, 38.8K views, 119 likes. Social signal only.

@natedog1nc

Hims is really working for me and I hope my journey is helping others. #hims #balding #bald #selfcare

♬ original sound - Nathan

@natedog1nc, 32.1K views, 143 likes. The hair-loss subscription customer: showing up monthly because the product works. Social signal only.

@sukhrajsangha95

Want to know what happens if you stop your hair treatment for a month? Heres how my experiemce of not using @hims went and what I'll be doing about it #hairloss #hairgrowth #menshair #hims #balding #beforeandafter #hairlosstreatment #hairthinning

♬ 7AM - Slowed + Reverb - Adrian

@sukhrajsangha95, 19.6K views, 153 likes. Churn risk in one video: what happens if you stop. Social signal only.

Section 3 - Strengths: the moat that is real

1. The subscription base compounds on its own. Subscribers grew from 609,000 at end-FY2021 to 2,511,000 at end-FY2025 - a 4x increase in four years. Monthly revenue per average subscriber grew from $53 (FY2022) to $83 (FY2025), a 57% lift over three years. Both metrics moved in the same direction simultaneously, which is what a functioning subscription platform looks like: you acquire a customer once, and the revenue grows as they add products or move to longer billing cadences. The 10-K (FY2025, MD&A) attributes the ARPU increase specifically to "growth in personalized offerings" and the shift to multi-month subscription intervals, which reduce per-order fulfilment costs. Non-GLP-1 revenue already exceeded $1.2B in FY2024, per the Q4 2024 earnings release, meaning the base business without weight loss is a substantial recurring revenue engine.

2. The owned-pharmacy model is a genuine structural advantage. The FY2022 10-K makes the mechanism explicit: "The increase in gross margin...was primarily due to lower product and packaging costs as a percent of revenue as a result of fulfilling greater order volume by Affiliated Pharmacies at lower costs as compared to third-party pharmacies." The result was gross margin expanding from 75% to 78% (FY2022) to 82% (FY2023) as the owned pharmacy scale grew. By FY2023, HIMS's two owned pharmacies - XeCare in Ohio and Apostrophe Pharmacy in Arizona - were filling the majority of prescriptions. Most DTC health platforms earn thin referral economics; HIMS captures the dispensing margin directly. An 82% gross margin put HIMS at the very top of our public DTC margin leaderboard, well above where most direct-to-consumer brands land.

3. Marketing efficiency is improving at scale. Marketing as a percentage of revenue fell from 51% (FY2023) to 46% (FY2024) to 39% (FY2025), while revenue grew 59% in FY2025. That is a 12-point reduction in marketing intensity over two years on a doubling revenue base. For a business that started at 50% marketing spend in FY2021, this is the operating-efficiency story. In Q1 2026, marketing fell further to 36.5% of revenue. The direction is right even if the revenue growth is decelerating.

4. The platform is genuinely multi-category. The FY2021 10-K listed "diabetes, weight loss, cholesterol, and hypertension" as future opportunities - four years before the GLP-1 wave. The base categories that existed before weight loss (sexual health, hair loss, mental health, dermatology) continue to grow: the Hims brand grew more than 30% YoY in FY2025, and the Hers brand grew triple digits. CEO Andrew Dudum has stated a $6.5B revenue target for 2030, with the Hers platform alone targeting $1B in annual revenue in 2026. Whether those targets are achievable is a separate question; the point is that multi-category breadth is real and growing.

Section 4 - Weaknesses: the cracks in the filing

1. The compounding wind-down is verbatim risk, not editorial. The FY2025 10-K (Item 1A) states:

"On February 21, 2025, the FDA resolved the semaglutide shortage. Resolution of the shortage limits our ability to use 503B outsourcing facilities to provide access to compounded semaglutide on our platform. In particular, we currently only use 503A compounding pharmacies for the fulfillment and dispensing of compounded GLP-1 products, which limits our current use of 503B outsourcing facilities and may constrain our ability to meet customer demand, which could adversely affect our results of operations."

Management's own Q4 2024 earnings guidance put weight-loss revenue at approximately $725M in FY2025. The company never disclosed GLP-1 revenue as a separate line in its financial statements. When the shortage ended, Q1 2026 revenue grew 3.8% YoY. The math is not hard: the loophole closed and the growth stopped.

2. The Novo Nordisk relationship is not a reliable foundation. The sequence, traced to the FY2025 10-K and dated press:

• April 29, 2025: HIMS and Novo Nordisk announce a collaboration to offer Wegovy on the Hims platform.
• June 23, 2025: Novo terminates it 55 days later, citing HIMS's continued promotion of compounded GLP-1 alongside the branded product. HIMS stock falls about 35% that day.
• June 2025: a securities class action (Sookdeo v. Hims & Hers Health, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-05315, N.D. Cal.) is filed, alleging misrepresentations "regarding the business relationship between the Company and Novo Nordisk" over the April 29-June 22, 2025 class period.
• February 9, 2026: Novo files a patent-infringement suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware over the compounded-semaglutide products, seeking a permanent injunction that would run until the patent expires December 5, 2031.

HIMS has since resumed fulfilling branded Wegovy under a reset arrangement, but the entire branded-GLP-1 strategy now runs through the same counterparty that walked away inside 55 days and then sued. That is not a moat. It is a concentration.

3. The DOJ referral and FDA naming are not boilerplate. The FY2025 10-K (Item 1A) states verbatim:

"In February 2026, the FDA issued a statement (the FDA Statement) indicating that the agency intends to restrict GLP-1 active pharmaceutical ingredients intended for use in non-FDA-approved compounded drugs that are being mass-marketed as similar alternatives to FDA-approved drugs. We were directly named in the FDA Statement. Also in February 2026, the General Counsel of HHS issued a statement on X indicating that HHS had referred the Company to the Department of Justice (the DOJ) for investigation for potential violations of the FDCA and applicable Title 18 provisions."

These are subsequent-event disclosures in a filing dated February 2026, not hypothetical risks. A DOJ investigation and a direct FDA naming sit on top of the securities and patent litigation already in motion - and the legal and deal-related load is showing up in the cost base, with G&A rising sharply in Q1 2026.

4. Gross margin compression is structural, not a one-quarter event. The trend from the filings: FY2023 (82%) to FY2024 (79.5%) to FY2025 (73.8%) to Q1 2026 (65.2%). The FY2025 10-K (MD&A) attributes the decline to "our weight loss offerings, which have shorter shipping cadences and increased fulfillment costs." Cost of revenue grew 102% in FY2025 - more than double the 59% revenue growth - because GLP-1 kits cost more to make and ship per order than a finasteride subscription. The margin degradation began before the FDA closed the loophole. The Q1 2026 print - 65.2% - shows the floor when the high-cost, high-volume GLP-1 business contracts while the cost base does not.

Section 5 - Opportunities and threats

The opportunity side of the ledger is real. The Hers brand is the clearest: triple-digit revenue growth, nearly 40% of U.S. revenue in FY2025, and a stated target of $1B in Hers revenue in 2026. The menopause specialty launched October 2025. Hormone health (low testosterone), sleep, longevity, and at-home lab testing (YourBio acquired January 2026 for $150M) expand the addressable subscriber base beyond the original male-facing ED/hair portfolio.

International expansion is the company's explicit escape hatch from U.S. regulatory pressure. ZAVA - acquired in July 2025 for approximately $258M - brought UK and EU operations. Livewell (Canada) was acquired in November 2025. Eucalyptus (Australia, UK, Germany, Canada, Japan) was announced for up to $1.15B in February 2026. Rest-of-World revenue grew 399% YoY in FY2025 to $134M, almost entirely from ZAVA's Q3–Q4 consolidation. Management guided $200M+ of Eucalyptus revenue contribution in the second half of 2026 if the deal closes on schedule.

The threat layer has two tiers. The competitive tier: Eli Lilly's LillyDirect launched Zepbound direct at $499/month in July 2025. Novo Nordisk's NovoCare pharmacy sells Wegovy at $499/month. Both pharma companies are selling directly to consumers at prices that compress the price advantage a telehealth intermediary can offer. Ro and LifeMD hold their own Novo partnerships. Amazon is expanding same-day prescription delivery to approximately half of U.S. households. The HIMS 10-K states that it faces competition from "pharmaceutical companies that have entered the direct-to-consumer healthcare industry" without naming them - but the names above are not hard to supply.

The regulatory tier: telehealth prescribing rules remain in flux. COVID-era DEA flexibilities for controlled substances were extended through 2025 but have not been made permanent. Asynchronous telehealth - which is how the HIMS model primarily works - is still restricted in some states. The corporate practice of medicine structure (Affiliated Medical Groups as VIEs, not direct employees) is another ongoing compliance surface. The FTC issued a Civil Investigative Demand in October 2023 regarding privacy, advertising, and cancellation practices; as of the FY2025 10-K filing date, no conclusions had been communicated.

Section 6 - The macro environment

The structural demand for GLP-1 obesity drugs is not in dispute. Clinical adoption of semaglutide and tirzepatide has expanded to tens of millions of patients. The question for HIMS is not whether demand is durable - it is - but who captures the economics. Before February 2025, HIMS captured a compounding margin at scale. After February 2025, the economics shifted back toward brand manufacturers, licensed pharmacy chains, and the pharma companies' own DTC channels.

The broader DTC-health consumer trend runs in HIMS's favour: approximately one in four consumers says they would switch providers if virtual visit options are not available (Deloitte 2025 outlook). Subscription healthcare, cost transparency, and virtual-first care are consumer preferences that are gaining share from traditional clinical visits. HIMS built a platform aligned to those preferences and is not losing that positioning.

The headwind is the regulatory overlay specifically on compounding pharmacies. The FDA's Section 503A and 503B framework was always a drug-shortage accommodation, not a permanent DTC channel. The drug manufacturers - Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly - are not passive bystanders to generic compounded versions of their blockbuster drugs; both lobbied the FDA to end the shortage designation and both have filed suit against compounders. HIMS was the highest-profile target.

Competition in telehealth has deepened. Teladoc now offers a GLP-1 self-pay option. Amazon One Medical integrates with pharmacy delivery. The enterprise-to-consumer channel (employers and payers funding GLP-1 coverage) is an area where Ro and LifeMD are more deeply integrated with benefits platforms than HIMS. The platform's March 2026 strategic shift to branded drugs puts HIMS in essentially the same position as Ro, LifeMD, and every other telehealth intermediary: a front-end conversion and relationship layer for drugs that Novo and Lilly now control.

Section 7 - The CFO verdict and the operator bridge

Here is the read on Hims & Hers from a CFO's vantage point.

The business model is structurally sound. A 73.8% gross margin, far above the average DTC gross margin for public companies, sustained by owned-pharmacy infrastructure and recurring subscription billing is not a fluke - it is a real cost advantage that took years to build. The $300M operating cash flow in FY2025 confirms that the operational engine is not broken. The subscriber base of 2.5 million growing at 9% YoY in Q1 2026, even while the GLP-1 revenue was contracting, means the underlying platform retained customers through a significant disruption.

The growth that got them here was rented. The FDA's compounded-semaglutide authorisation was always predicated on a shortage designation - that is how Section 503A works, and it is not a loophole in the pejorative sense, it is a statutory mechanism with a built-in expiration. HIMS did not invent the loophole; it deployed into it faster and at larger scale than any competitor. When the shortage ended, the growth rate snapped back to the platform's organic rate, and the margin compressed because the GLP-1 business carries a structurally lower gross margin than the core subscription categories.

The international M&A bet is rational and worth watching. If Eucalyptus closes on schedule in mid-2026 and contributes $200M+ in second-half revenue, the company's FY2026 guidance of $2.8B-$3.0B becomes achievable without a full GLP-1 recovery. But the company raised $1.0B in convertible notes to fund this expansion, which has transformed the balance sheet from net-cash to net-debt. Total liabilities grew from $230.8M (end-FY2024) to $1,613.8M (end-FY2025). The operational cash flow supports it; a second major setback would not.

The operator bridge. Your $5–80M DTC brand almost certainly has a version of the HIMS pattern - smaller in magnitude, invisible unless you are looking for it. You have a channel, a trend, a supplier relationship, or a regulatory accommodation that is driving your best numbers. The tell is always the same: gross margin starts compressing the same quarter revenue accelerates. When those two lines diverge, the question to ask is whether the new revenue is structurally higher-cost or whether it is rented from a condition you do not control.

HIMS's gross margin peaked at 82% in FY2023 - the year before the GLP-1 surge. In FY2024, when GLP-1 revenue drove 69% revenue growth, margin fell to 79%. The cost signal came before the revenue party ended. The business that pressure-tests concentration in real time - not after the FDA letter or the partner termination - is the business that keeps the margin when the music stops.

Early-warning scorecard - five lines that catch this 12 months early:

1. Gross margin direction vs. revenue acceleration: if both are moving together, you are scaling efficiently. If revenue is accelerating and gross margin is compressing, something is higher-cost than the rest of your business.
2. Single-category or single-supplier revenue concentration: HIMS never disclosed GLP-1 as a separate line. If you cannot tell a CFO what percentage of revenue comes from your top product or channel, you cannot manage the concentration.
3. Regulatory authorisation shelf life: compounding was always shortage-contingent. If your best revenue lever requires a government classification, a platform policy, or a third-party contract to remain in place, model what happens when it changes.
4. Counterparty depth in your key partnerships: a partnership that can be terminated in 55 days is a single-threaded dependency. Before building a revenue strategy around one supplier or partner, know their termination rights and their incentive to use them.
5. Cost of revenue growing faster than revenue: HIMS's cost of revenue grew 102% in FY2025 against 59% revenue growth. That ratio is the earliest available signal that margin is about to compress.

If you want to run this scorecard against your own P&L before your version of February 21, 2025 arrives, that is a fractional CFO conversation. The work takes a few hours. The cost of not doing it is a quarter like Q1 2026.

Sources and methodology

SEC EDGAR is the primary source for every number in this post. Hims & Hers Health, Inc. (CIK 0001773751) files on SEC EDGAR under the 10-K (annual) and 10-Q (quarterly) form types. The specific filings used: 10-K FY2025 (filed 2026-02-23, accession 0001773751-26-000022); 10-Q Q1 FY2026 (filed 2026-05-11, accession 0001773751-26-000076); 10-K FY2024 (filed 2025-02-24, accession 0001773751-25-000062); and extracts from the FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023 10-Ks read directly on SEC EDGAR. Revenue, gross margin, operating income, net income, OCF, subscriber count, and all balance sheet figures are taken directly from these filings. The quarterly operating-income figures ($57.9M, $26.7M, $11.8M through 2025; -$78.3M in Q1 2026) are from the SEC EDGAR pull dated 2026-06-22; Q4 2025 ($9.2M) is derived as the FY2025 total ($105.6M) less the three reported 10-Q quarters, since Q4 is reported only inside the 10-K.

Published analyst and industry research provided the business-model, strengths/weaknesses, competitive/macro, and opportunities analysis. It draws on the FY2025 10-K and Q1 2026 10-Q as primary sources, with HIMS investor relations press releases and earnings call transcripts as secondary sources. That research supplied the competitive map (LillyDirect and NovoCare at $499/month, Ro and LifeMD positioning), the international-acquisition detail, and the GLP-1 demand-durability framing. Where its claims could not be reconciled to a primary filing or dated press - for example, a precise decomposition of the Q1 2026 operating loss, or the post-filing status of the Novo litigation - they were excluded from the body or stated conservatively.

Dated press corroborates the Novo Nordisk timeline. The April 29, 2025 partnership announcement is sourced from the HIMS investor relations press release. The June 23, 2025 termination is sourced from Fierce Healthcare ("Hims & Hers stock plunges 30% as Novo Nordisk terminates Wegovy direct sales deal," fiercehealthcare.com, June 23, 2025). The February 9, 2026 patent suit is disclosed in the FY2025 10-K (Item 1A) verbatim. The March 9, 2026 strategic shift is from the HIMS investor relations press release.

The $725M weight-loss revenue guidance is from Fierce Healthcare's coverage of HIMS's Q4 2024 earnings (February 24, 2025): "Hims & Hers projects its weight loss business to bring in $725 million in revenue" in 2025. HIMS itself does not break out GLP-1 or weight-loss revenue as a separate line in its financial statements, which is noted as a material information gap.

Social signal is colour only. Reddit, Twitter/X, and TikTok sentiment was collected as consumer sentiment context, not load-bearing fact. The TikTok embeds in Section 2 are authentic customer-journey UGC related to hair loss and the Hims subscription experience; they illustrate the subscription retention mechanic but do not constitute evidence of any financial claim.

Limitations. HIMS does not disclose category-level revenue (GLP-1 vs. sexual health vs. hair loss vs. other), which makes it impossible to precisely quantify the weight-loss concentration from the filings alone. The Novo Nordisk patent suit (No. 1:26-cv-0014) and the DOJ referral are disclosed but the outcomes are unknown as of this writing. The Eucalyptus acquisition had not closed as of the article date; its revenue contribution is management-guided, not reported. All forward-looking statements in this post are attributed to management or analysts; the author's opinion is clearly marked as such.

Frequently asked questions

is hims & hers actually profitable?

In FY2025 the company posted $128.4M net income and $300M operating cash flow - that profitability is real. In Q1 2026, following the FDA's closure of the compounded semaglutide loophole, HIMS swung to a $92.1M net loss. The base business (subscription, owned pharmacies, sexual health and hair) is profitable; the question is how long the GLP-1 transition takes to restabilise.

what happened with hims and novo nordisk?

Hims & Hers and Novo Nordisk announced a Wegovy partnership on April 29, 2025. Novo terminated it on June 23, 2025, citing concerns about Hims selling compounded GLP-1 drugs alongside the branded product. The stock fell roughly 35% that day. Novo then filed a patent-infringement suit in the District of Delaware in February 2026, seeking an injunction until the patent expires in 2031. Hims has since resumed fulfilling branded Wegovy on its platform under a reset arrangement, though the securities and patent litigation disclosed in the FY2025 10-K remained unresolved as of that filing.

what is hims & hers' gross margin and why is it high?

FY2025 gross margin was 73.8%, down from a peak of 82% in FY2023 and 79.5% in FY2024. The high baseline reflects the subscription model (no retail middleman), a growing mix of internally fulfilled prescriptions through wholly-owned pharmacies, and recurring-cadence billing that reduces per-order fulfilment costs. The compression from 82% to 65.2% (Q1 2026) is directly attributable to the weight-loss product mix, which carries shorter shipping cadences and higher fulfilment costs.

what is the glp-1 compounding issue and how does it affect hims?

The FDA authorises compounded versions of brand-name drugs only while those drugs are on the FDA's official shortage list. HIMS launched compounded injectable semaglutide in May 2024 while semaglutide was in shortage. The FDA resolved the shortage on February 21, 2025. That ended the legal basis for large-scale 503B compounding of semaglutide, forcing HIMS to wind down that product line or transition to smaller-batch 503A compounding and eventually to branded alternatives. The wind-down is the direct cause of Q1 2026's revenue deceleration and margin collapse.

who are hims & hers' main competitors?

In DTC telehealth: Ro, LifeMD, and Teladoc compete across similar condition verticals. In GLP-1 specifically: Eli Lilly's LillyDirect launched Zepbound direct to consumers at $499/month in July 2025; Novo Nordisk's NovoCare pharmacy also sells Wegovy direct at $499/month. Amazon's expanding same-day prescription delivery adds fulfilment competition. The 10-K does not name competitors individually but characterises them as companies offering "components of telehealth or address conditions that compete with our solutions."

what does hims & hers' capital structure look like now?

As of Q1 2026, HIMS holds approximately $750.9M in cash and investments but also carries $974.1M in net convertible senior notes (0%, due 2030) raised in May 2025. Total liabilities jumped from $230.8M at year-end 2024 to $1,613.8M at year-end 2025. The company has a $175M revolving credit facility (JPMorgan). The capital structure is now debt-funded, though the $300M OCF in FY2025 suggests the operational business can service it.

what is hims & hers' 2026 guidance?

As of the Q1 2026 earnings release (May 11, 2026), management guided full-year 2026 revenue of $2.8B to $3.0B and Adjusted EBITDA of $275M to $350M. Q1 2026 revenue came in at $608.1M, within the guided range of $600M-$625M.

what is the eucalyptus acquisition?

Eucalyptus is an Australian digital health platform operating in Australia, the UK, Germany, Canada, and Japan. Hims & Hers announced a proposed acquisition in February 2026, valued at up to $1.15B (~$240M in cash, with the remainder in contingent consideration). The deal is expected to close mid-2026 and would significantly expand HIMS's international footprint, adding management-cited potential for $200M+ in second-half 2026 revenue contribution if closed on schedule.