Capex vs Revenue Growth: Public DTC 2026

Executive summary. Across 14 public DTC and CPG brands in 2026, capex intensity ranges from 0.08% (Olaplex) to 10.79% (Vital Farms) with a 2.11% median. Revenue growth has no linear relationship with capex. The translator variable is operating discipline. Lululemon, Vital Farms, and e.l.f. Beauty are winning at radically different capex levels. Warby Parker is a textbook capital trap.

Every founder I've coached for 35+ ecommerce, DTC, and CPG brands across the Eightx portfolio has asked the same question in some form: am I reinvesting enough? The honest answer is that "enough" is the wrong question. The right question is does the capex you're already spending translate to revenue growth? For most brands, the answer is no, but they don't realize it because they never run the cross-metric.

This post runs that cross-metric across 14 publicly-traded DTC and CPG brands using FY2025 and FY2026 SEC 10-K data. Every number below is sourced. Every quadrant placement is defensible. And every "capital trap" call I make is a brand whose capex is real but whose growth is not catching up, so the equity story breaks.

I had a company that was doing $80 million and they had made 16 months in a row of profit and they still couldn't find the capital that they wanted., that's the trap on the other side. Strong cash flow, but no flexibility to invest. The brands below have flexibility. The question is whether they're using it.

What is the framework: capex without growth = capital trap

Cross-metric analysis means plotting two variables against each other and asking what the joint distribution tells you. Capex intensity (capital expenditures as a percent of revenue) and revenue growth are the two variables I run for every CFO engagement. The joint distribution falls into four quadrants:

The brutal version of this framework: capex without growth is balance-sheet damage. Growth without capex is either real (asset-light winners) or fake (CAC-funded burn). The cross-metric tells you which is which. The single-metric view does not.

Where do the 14 public DTC brands actually sit on capex and revenue?

Below is the full dataset I'm working from. Capex intensity and revenue come from the latest SEC 10-K filing for each company (FY2025 or FY2026 depending on fiscal year-end). Revenue growth ranges are blended from Perplexity's 2026 DTC market research and the company-specific sources I cite at the bottom.

Company	Revenue (FY)	Capex %	Rev growth	Op margin
Lululemon	$11.1B (FY26)	6.13%	~15%	19.91%
Yeti	$1.87B (FY26)	2.28%	~12%	11.43%
Celsius Holdings	$1.32B (FY23)	2.74%	~25-50%*	10.70%
e.l.f. Beauty	$1.31B (FY25)	1.41%	~14%	12.03%
Revolve	$1.23B (FY25)	0.93%	~5-7%	6.06%
Stitch Fix	$1.23B (FY18)*	1.33%	declining	-3.17%
Funko	$908M (FY25)	3.63%	flat-to-down	-5.01%
Warby Parker	$872M (FY25)	7.69%	~9-10%	-0.61%
Vital Farms	$759M (FY25)	10.79%	~18-22%	11.64%
Bark Inc.	$484M (FY25)	n/a (low)	flat	-7.26%
Olaplex	$423M (FY25)	0.08%	declining	1.64%
FIGS	$420M (FY21)*	1.95%	~5%	9.09%
Honest Co	$371M (FY25)	0.41%	~5%	-4.97%
Beauty Health	$301M (FY25)	0.10%	declining	-6.92%
Beyond Meat	$275M (FY25)	4.47%	declining	-121.10%

*Stitch Fix and FIGS show older fiscal years where the EDGAR pull resolved cleanly; the qualitative direction (declining, ~5%) reflects more recent disclosures. Celsius Holdings growth blends 2023-2025 trajectory. Capex % column is capex as percent of revenue from the most recent 10-K with complete data.

The headline math: median capex intensity is 2.11%, the 25th percentile is 1.03%, the 75th percentile is 4.26%, and the maximum is 10.79%. Half of the brands sit between 1% and 4.3%. The outliers above 6% (Warby Parker at 7.69%, Lululemon at 6.13%, Vital Farms at 10.79%) are the brands betting on physical or supply chain infrastructure. The outliers below 0.5% (Olaplex at 0.08%, Beauty Health at 0.10%, Honest Co at 0.41%) are running asset-light or running on fumes.

For the full distribution and methodology, see Capex intensity: how much public DTC brands reinvest 2026. For vertical breakdowns (apparel vs beauty vs food), see Capex intensity by DTC vertical 2026.

Who are the high-capex + high-growth winners?

Three brands in the dataset are spending at the top of the capex distribution and producing real growth at healthy margins. They share one thing: the capex builds an asset that competitors cannot replicate quickly.

Lululemon: 6.13% capex, ~15% revenue growth, 19.91% operating margin

The cleanest compounder in the dataset. Lululemon spends $681M of capex on $11.1B revenue (6.13% intensity) and converts that into roughly 15% YoY growth at an operating margin near 20%. The capex is going into an omnichannel store network and supply chain densification, including Asia-Pacific distribution centers. About 65% of sales come from physical retail, and repeat rate exceeds 40%. Marketing spend is just 5.56% of revenue, well below the 12-22% S&M intensity at peer DTC brands.

Why this works: at $11.1B of revenue with 56.6% gross margin, Lululemon can absorb 6%+ capex and still generate $2.2B+ of operating income. The new stores compound, each location amortizes against a brand that's already well-known in the local market, so unit economics ramp fast.

Vital Farms: 10.79% capex, ~18-22% growth, 11.64% operating margin

The highest-capex brand in the dataset, and growing the fastest. Vital Farms spends $82M of capex on $759M revenue, almost entirely into pasture-raised supply chain verticalization, egg supply, pasture facilities, and Midwest expansion designed to boost capacity ~50%. The result: 22% unit growth at 11.64% operating margin while gross margin (37.62%) is much thinner than apparel peers because eggs are a commodity-adjacent food category.

Why this works: the capex is buying defensibility in a category where supply control is the moat. You cannot win pasture-raised egg distribution by spending more on Meta ads. You win by owning the farms and the cold chain. Vital Farms is doing exactly that, and the operating margin is improving in step with the capex.

Yeti: 2.28% capex, ~12% growth, 11.43% operating margin

The smaller compounder. Yeti spends $43M of capex on $1.87B revenue, focused on owned manufacturing (Texas HQ expansion and reduced reliance on China amid tariff exposure) and selective retail footprint expansion. Revenue growth in the low double digits with operating margin holding above 11% despite a 30%+ rise in CAC industry-wide. Notably, S&M is just 7.78% of revenue, extremely disciplined.

Why this works: Yeti's capex isn't about retail expansion at the same scale as Lululemon. It's about manufacturing control. As tariff pressure rose in 2025, the brands with owned production protected gross margin while peers got hit. Yeti's 2.28% capex is small, but it's strategically allocated.

Who is in the capital trap quadrant: high capex, low growth?

This is the quadrant founders need to see, because it's the quadrant they're at risk of slipping into. Capex is real, growth is not catching up, and the operating margin is bleeding.

Warby Parker: 7.69% capex, ~9-10% growth, -0.61% operating margin

Warby Parker is spending the second-highest capex percentage in the dataset (7.69%, or ~$67M on $872M revenue) on retail store buildouts. Revenue growth is in the high single digits to low double digits, respectable, but not enough to absorb the capex. Operating margin is barely below zero (-0.61%), which means the stores are not yet generating contribution sufficient to cover the new-store ramp. SG&A intensity is a punishing 54.58% of revenue.

The story: Warby Parker has a credible brand and a real omnichannel strategy. But the math right now says each new store is consuming capital faster than it's adding incremental contribution. Either store productivity has to ramp (more glasses sold per square foot, faster), or the capex pace has to slow. Hoping growth catches up to capex is the wrong financial answer.

I see this same pattern at private mid-market DTC brands too, usually around the $30-80M range, where founders see Lululemon and decide to "build their own retail." Without the brand awareness, gross margin, and operating margin Lululemon has, the same playbook destroys cash.

Beyond Meat: 4.47% capex, declining revenue, -121.10% operating margin

The most extreme version of the capital trap. Beyond Meat is spending 4.47% of revenue on capex while revenue is shrinking and operating margin is catastrophically negative. The capex is mostly maintenance and prior-period commitments, but in a declining-revenue scenario any capex is a capital trap unless it's directly tied to fixing the demand problem. Beyond Meat is the case study for "stop spending and figure out the customer first."

Who is winning asset-light: low capex, high growth?

The opposite of the capital trap. These brands grow without spending much on physical infrastructure because the moat is brand, creative, or product velocity.

e.l.f. Beauty: 1.41% capex, ~14% growth, 12.03% operating margin

The cleanest asset-light winner. e.l.f. spends just 1.41% of revenue on capex ($18M on $1.31B) and produces ~14% growth at 12% operating margin. The brand reinvests heavily into creative and product (S&M is 21.43% of revenue, well above peers) but does not need to own stores or manufacturing. Most production is outsourced; distribution is mass retail and pure DTC.

Why this works: e.l.f.'s gross margin is 71.24%, beauty CPG economics. With that gross margin, you can afford 21% S&M and still print 12% operating margin. The capex isn't necessary because the unit economics work without owning physical assets. e.l.f. produces roughly 10x more growth per dollar of capex than Warby Parker.

Revolve: 0.93% capex, modest growth, 6.06% operating margin

Apparel DTC done asset-light. Revolve spends well under 1% of revenue on capex ($11M on $1.23B) and runs the entire business through a marketplace-style merchandising model, own the customer, do not own the inventory or stores at scale. Growth is modest (~5-7%) but margins are positive and the model is cash-generative.

Revolve is the brand most $20-100M private DTC apparel brands should be benchmarking against, not Lululemon. Sub-1% capex, mid-single-digit growth, 6%+ operating margin is a sustainable model that doesn't require constant capital raises.

Olaplex: 0.08% capex, declining revenue

The cautionary subset of asset-light. Olaplex spends almost nothing on capex (0.08% of revenue) but revenue is declining. Asset-light only works if growth holds. When growth turns negative, low-capex becomes "managing the business for cash flow" rather than "winning." Operating margin remains barely positive at 1.64%, but with 170 days of inventory and limited reinvestment, the business is reading like a brand in defensive mode rather than a growth story.

The stalled quadrant, low capex, low growth, is the warning lane. Honest Co (0.41% capex, ~5% growth, -4.97% operating margin) and Beauty Health (0.10% capex, declining, -6.92% margin) are not reinvesting and not growing. The narrative is usually "focused on profitability." The reality is "no reinvestment thesis." That is what eventually shows up as a take-private, a strategic sale, or a slow wind-down.

What is the decision framework: when should a DTC brand invest capex?

Drawing the cross-metric analysis back to the brands I actually advise (private $5M-$150M ecommerce, DTC, and CPG): here's the framework I run for capex decisions.

Rule 1: Capex follows demonstrated unit economics. Never the other way around.

If your contribution margin is below 20% and you're not sure why, do not deploy capex into stores, owned warehousing, or in-house manufacturing. Capex amplifies whatever unit economics you have. Bad unit economics + capex = the Warby Parker quadrant. Good unit economics + capex = the Lululemon quadrant. The order matters.

Practical version: prove the model at sub-2% capex first (the e.l.f./Revolve/Olaplex playbook) until you have at least 12 months of consistent contribution margin and operating margin data. Then deploy capex.

Rule 2: Capex must clear an internal hurdle rate.

For most DTC brands I work with, that's 15-25% pre-tax IRR on a realistic (not optimistic) demand model. Build the spreadsheet. Run it under three scenarios: base, optimistic, downside. If the IRR clears 15% in the downside, deploy. If the IRR only clears 15% in the base case, slow down. If the IRR only clears 15% in the optimistic case, do not deploy.

I've watched founders skip this and build retail or warehousing on the back of an Excel deck where revenue grows 30% annually for five years. Those don't pencil. Always run the downside.

Rule 3: Capex must be sequenced against working capital.

A 6% capex year is unworkable for most $10M-$50M brands without a credit line or equity raise sized to cover both the capex and the inventory buildup that growth implies. The cross-metric is capex × revenue growth. If revenue grows 30%, inventory probably grows 30%+ too. So a brand spending 6% of revenue on capex while growing 30% is also spending another 4-6% of revenue on net working capital. That's 10-12% of revenue in cash needs in one year.

That's why I tell founders: before you decide on capex, model the cash needs of growth itself. Most brands run out of cash not because capex was wrong, but because they didn't model how growth alone consumes capital.

Rule 4: Match the capex type to the moat.

If your moat is brand and creative (e.l.f., Revolve), keep capex under 2% and reinvest into S&M and product. If your moat is physical experience (Lululemon, Warby Parker if they fix it), capex into stores can compound. If your moat is supply chain control (Vital Farms, Yeti), capex into manufacturing or distribution centers compounds. Capex in the wrong moat lane (e.g., a beauty CPG building factories instead of investing in creative) destroys returns.

For more on how operating margin interacts with this, see Operating margin: public DTC 2026.

Capex sequence by stage: $5M-$25M brands keep capex below 1%, reinvest in product and creative, prove unit economics. $25M-$75M brands deploy 1-3%, selectively into one of: small-format retail, owned warehouse, or proprietary tech. $75M-$150M brands move to 3-6% if operating margin is consistently above 8%. $150M+ brands with 10%+ operating margin can run 4-10%, that's Lululemon territory. Our fractional CFO service runs this capital-allocation logic with $5M-$150M brands every quarter.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does higher capex translate to higher revenue growth for public DTC brands?

Not directly. The 2026 cross-analysis of 14 public DTC and CPG brands shows no linear relationship between capex intensity and revenue growth. Lululemon (6.13% capex, ~15% growth) and Vital Farms (10.79% capex, ~18% growth) are high-capex winners. e.l.f. Beauty (1.41% capex, ~14% growth) is an asset-light winner. Warby Parker (7.69% capex, ~9% growth, -0.6% operating margin) sits in the capital trap quadrant. The translator variable is operating discipline (S&M and SG&A as % of revenue), not capex itself.

What is the median capex intensity for public DTC brands in 2026?

The median capex intensity across 14 public DTC and CPG brands in the 2026 SEC dataset is 2.11% of revenue. The 25th percentile is 1.03%, the 75th percentile is 4.26%, and the maximum is 10.79% (Vital Farms). Pure-DTC brands without retail or manufacturing footprint cluster at a lower median (~0.93%). Retail-blended and manufacturing-heavy brands (Warby Parker, Lululemon, Vital Farms) cluster around 6-11%.

Which public DTC brand has the best capex-to-growth ratio in 2026?

On a pure efficiency basis, e.l.f. Beauty leads. With 1.41% capex intensity and ~14% revenue growth, the brand generates roughly 10x more growth per dollar of capex than peers. On an absolute scale, Lululemon's 6.13% capex producing ~15% growth at 19.9% operating margin is the best capital-allocation outcome in the dataset because the capex builds defensible physical-retail moats that compound.

What does it mean when a DTC brand has high capex and low growth?

It means the brand is in a capital trap. Capex is being spent on assets (stores, warehouses, manufacturing) that are not converting to top-line growth fast enough to justify the spend. Warby Parker (7.69% capex, ~9% growth, -0.6% operating margin) is the cleanest example in 2026. The fix is either accelerate growth (more stores per market, faster category expansion) or decelerate capex (close underperforming locations, partner instead of build) until margin improves.

Should an early-stage DTC brand follow Lululemon's high-capex model or e.l.f.'s asset-light model?

Asset-light, almost always. Lululemon's 6.13% capex works because the brand has $11.1B of revenue, 56.6% gross margin, and 19.9% operating margin to absorb the spend. A $5M-$50M brand spending 6% of revenue on retail or manufacturing capex will starve working capital and crush cash flow. The right sequence is: prove unit economics asset-light first (e.l.f., Olaplex, Revolve model at 0.08-1.41% capex), reach $50M-$100M with healthy margins, then deploy capex into defensible physical or supply chain assets.

Sources and methodology

Capex intensity, revenue, gross margin, operating margin, and S&M/SG&A percent of revenue are sourced from each company's most recent SEC 10-K filing on EDGAR (FY2025 or FY2026). The fiscal year is noted in the data table where it differs.

Revenue growth ranges blend three sources: (1) the most recent 10-K YoY revenue change for each company, (2) Perplexity's 2026 DTC market research synthesizing Yotpo, Attn Agency, TYB, and Big Blue benchmarks, and (3) brand-specific commentary from each company's earnings releases. Growth ranges are presented qualitatively where the most recent fiscal year did not provide a clean YoY number; this is noted in the table footnote.

Median capex intensity (2.11%), 25th percentile (1.03%), 75th percentile (4.26%), and maximum (10.79%) calculated across 14 brands with reported capex_intensity_pct in the underlying dataset.

For full methodology and the per-company capex distribution, see the underlying piece Capex intensity: how much public DTC brands reinvest 2026. For vertical-level cuts, see Capex intensity by DTC vertical 2026. For the operating-margin context that drives many of the quadrant calls above, see Operating margin: public DTC 2026.