YETI Holdings (YETI) Teardown: Numbers, Bear Case

$1.87 billion of revenue. A 57.4% gross margin in a category where the nearest public-company competitor runs negative operating margins. A 60% DTC channel mix that the company built over a decade. Then FY2026 arrives, and the US Drinkware business - the category that built YETI - posts its first annual revenue decline in company history.

That Drinkware number is where the YETI story cracks open. Not because the brand is broken. Because it reveals what is actually holding the margin together: a supply chain concentrated in China at the exact moment US trade policy turned that concentration into a 230-basis-point annual tax. The recall of 2022 cost $128.9M in operating income and left a four-year shadow. Now tariffs are the new structural headwind, and the fix - pivoting Drinkware manufacturing out of China - is the thing that caused the supply disruption that caused the US Drinkware decline in the first place.

This is the teardown of a genuine premium brand hitting a tariff wall and a category maturity ceiling at the same time.

Section 1 - The snapshot

Metric	FY2026 (yr ended Jan 3, 2026)	Q1 FY2027 (qtr ended Apr 4, 2026)	Q1 FY2026 (prior year)
Revenue	$1,868.5M	$380.4M	$351.1M
Revenue YoY	+2.1%	+8.3%	n/a
Gross margin	57.4%	55.3%	57.5%
Operating income	$213.6M (11.4%)	$12.4M (3.3%)	$21.7M (6.2%)
Net income	$165.4M	$9.9M	$16.6M
Diluted EPS	$2.03	$0.13	$0.20
Cash	$188.3M	$127.8M	n/a
Total debt	$73.8M	$72.1M	n/a
Net cash	$114.9M	$55.7M	n/a
Inventory	$290.6M	$318.4M	n/a
DTC channel	$1,127.8M (60%)	$196.8M (52%)	$196.2M (56%)
International	$394.4M (21%)	n/a	n/a

The five-year arc:

Fiscal year	Revenue	YoY growth	Gross margin	Operating margin	Key event
FY2021	$1,091.7M	n/a	57.6%	19.6%	Post-COVID demand surge
FY2022	$1,411.0M	+29.2%	57.8%	19.5%	Peak revenue growth; freight headwinds beginning
FY2023 (cal. 2022)	$1,595.2M	+13.1%	47.9%	7.9%	Hopper recall: $128.9M operating income hit
FY2024 (cal. 2023)	$1,658.7M	+4.0%	56.9%	13.6%	Recall recovery; freight normalization +370 bps
FY2025 (cal. 2024)	$1,829.9M	+10.3%	58.1%	13.4%	Peak gross margin; International +31%; Mystery Ranch/Butter Pat closed
FY2026 (ended Jan 3, 2026)	$1,868.5M	+2.1%	57.4%	11.4%	Tariffs: -230 bps; first US Drinkware decline; $297.6M buyback

Section 2 - The business model: how they actually make money

YETI sells premium outdoor durables - drinkware, coolers, bags, apparel, and accessories - through two channels at a price point that reflects genuine quality positioning rather than marketing markup alone. The 20-oz Rambler Tumbler with MagSlider Lid is the hero SKU that expanded the brand from a cooler company into a daily-carry lifestyle product. The Tundra hard cooler is the original franchise.

The product mix breaks cleanly into two revenue lines. Drinkware - Rambler Tumblers, Bottles, Jugs, the Yonder Shaker Bottle - generated $1,085.8M in FY2026, or 58% of net sales. Coolers and Equipment - Tundra hard coolers, Hopper soft coolers, bags, the Mystery Ranch backpack line, Butter Pat cast iron cookware - generated $748.5M, or 40% of net sales. The remaining ~2% is Other.

The channel math is the key operating lever. DTC - YETI's websites, its 27 US retail stores, and Amazon Marketplace - generated $1,127.8M (60% of FY2026 net sales) and carries structurally higher gross margin than wholesale. The 10-K is explicit: "our DTC channel generally generates higher gross margin than our wholesale channel due to differentiated pricing between these channels." Wholesale - Dick's Sporting Goods, REI, Academy, Bass Pro Shops, Ace Hardware, Scheels, Tractor Supply, and international retail partners - generated $740.7M (40% of sales). DTC is where the margin lives; wholesale is distribution efficiency.

Where does the 57.4% gross margin actually come from? Three things working together: a genuine price premium (RTIC and Stanley price 20-40% lower on comparable SKUs), a 60% DTC channel that captures end-consumer pricing rather than sharing it with a retailer, and manufacturing relationships that held product costs down even as tariffs rose 230 bps in FY2026. The catch: the manufacturing relationships that kept product costs low were concentrated in China - exactly where the tariffs landed.

Manufacturing geography matters here. Tundra hard coolers are manufactured in the US (Iowa and Wisconsin) and the Philippines. Rambler drinkware and Hopper soft coolers were historically made in China. The 2025 tariff acceleration forced YETI to pivot: the FY2026 10-K states that "a majority of our Drinkware manufacturing capacity is now outside of China." That pivot is the right long-term call. It is also the thing that caused the supply-chain disruption that drove the first US Drinkware revenue decline in the company's history.

Here is what the drinkware culture looks like from the consumer side. These videos are category and sentiment signals, not financial facts.

@sacredhearts11

Second hand embarrassment #yeticup #pinkyeti #yeti #stanleytarget #stanleycups #fyp @YETI

♬ KUWTK _ You Look Like Clowns - Peacock

@sacredhearts11, 954.9K plays, 85.2K likes, 2,399 comments. "Second hand embarrassment" - tagging both #yeticup and #stanleycups. This is the drinkware culture-war video that defined the YETI-vs-Stanley moment in early 2024. Social signal only.

@rachael_h99

I 🫶🏼 my bottles hehe #frankgreen #yeti #hydroflask #drinkbottle #review #reusable #yetireview #hydroflaskreview #hydroflasks #frankgreenbottle

♬ original sound - Rachael Taylor

@rachael_h99, 1.5M plays, 63.9K likes, 585 comments. Frank Green vs YETI vs Hydro Flask comparison - the head-to-head drinkware review format that drives purchasing decisions for the premium segment. Social signal only.

@hydraulicforce1511

Stanley Vs yeti against lava #durabilitytest

♬ original sound - MechanicalForce

@hydraulicforce1511, 807.4K plays, 8,661 likes. Stanley vs YETI durability test against lava - the genre of content that signals brand identity is built around performance, not aesthetics. Social signal only.

Section 3 - Strengths: the moat that is real

1. A genuine gross-margin premium in a category where the alternative is negative operating margins. YETI ran 57.4% gross margin in FY2026. The most comparable public-company benchmark is Newell Brands' Outdoor and Recreation segment, which includes Coleman and Contigo - Newell O&R posted a reported operating margin of -14.1% in Q4 FY2025. That is not an apples-to-apples gross-margin comparison, but the direction is clear: YETI is running a qualitatively different financial model in the same product category. The premium brand position - an ambassador network of hunters, anglers, pitmasters, and outdoor athletes; 5,300 retail partners worldwide; a product quality story that holds up to the scrutiny TikTok applies to it - earns that margin. It did not evaporate during the recall year (the gross margin collapse in FY2023 was a reserve and write-down problem, not a consumer-pricing-power problem). Source: 10-K FY2026; Newell Brands Q4 FY2025 results.

2. A 60% DTC channel with structural pricing optionality. DTC was 60% of FY2026 net sales ($1,127.8M) - up from roughly 50% a few years prior. The DTC channel encompasses YETI.com, 27 US retail stores, and the Amazon Marketplace, which was the primary DTC growth driver in FY2025 and FY2026. When YETI raises prices - and it implemented selective drinkware price increases in Q2 FY2026 worth +40 bps of gross margin - it does so on 60% of its revenue without negotiating through a wholesale buyer. That is the active defense against tariff pass-through friction that a purely wholesale brand does not have. The 10-K acknowledges that Amazon dependency is a real risk: "Any adverse change in our relationship with Amazon...could adversely affect our continued DTC channel growth." But the concentration is an earned position, not an accident. Source: 10-K FY2026 MD&A.

3. A net-cash balance sheet with no funding overhang through 2028. At January 3, 2026: $188.3M cash, $73.8M total debt (Term Loan A maturing June 22, 2028), $300M revolving credit facility fully undrawn. Net cash position: $114.9M. YETI absorbed $297.6M in buybacks in FY2026 against $254.7M of operating cash flow - drawing down cash from $358.8M at the prior year-end - without touching the revolver or approaching covenant stress. For a brand facing a multi-year supply-chain pivot and tariff exposure, zero funding risk through 2028 is meaningful: YETI can weather a flat revenue year, accelerate manufacturing relocation capital, and continue returning cash to shareholders without a balance sheet constraint. Source: 10-K FY2026; 10-Q Q1 FY2027.

4. International is growing at a rate that structural DTC and US maturity cannot match. International net sales grew +31% in FY2025 and +16% in FY2026, reaching $394.4M (21% of total net sales). Japan launched in Q2 FY2025; YETI now distributes across the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Every international region grew in FY2026, even as US revenue declined 1% YoY. International revenue carries some freight and pricing disadvantage relative to the US DTC channel, but it is the growth vector least exposed to US consumer discretionary cycles and least affected by US tariff import costs (products consumed internationally do not face the same import-duty structure). Source: 10-K FY2026 MD&A.

Section 4 - Weaknesses: the cracks in the 10-Q

1. Drinkware - the category that made YETI - posted its first US decline in FY2026, and the supply-chain fix made it worse. Drinkware net sales fell 1% to $1,085.8M in FY2026. Management's verbatim language from the 10-K MD&A: "reflecting a promotional market environment, a cautious wholesale buying environment, and inventory constraints driven by our supply chain transition." That last phrase is the important one. The accelerated pivot away from China manufacturing - the right long-term call given tariff exposure - created short-term supply-chain disruptions that limited YETI's ability to fill Drinkware orders in 2025. The manufacturing fix became the near-term demand problem. The FY2026 10-K is explicit: "these accelerated diversification efforts caused short-term supply chain disruptions in 2025, which impacted our ability to source certain products." Source: 10-K FY2026, Item 7 MD&A (verbatim).

2. Tariffs cut 230 bps in FY2026 and are accelerating - with $66.5M of additional IEEPA exposure flagged for FY2027. The FY2026 10-K MD&A gross margin bridge states: "higher tariff costs, which unfavorably impacted gross margin by 230 basis points." On $1,868.5M in revenue, 230 bps is approximately $43M of incremental cost in a single year. More concerning: YETI estimates paying approximately $66.5M in IEEPA tariffs in the following fiscal year (FY2027, ending early 2027). Q1 FY2027 (quarter ended April 4, 2026) already shows 280 bps of tariff headwind on gross margin, driving gross margin to 55.3% - 215 bps lower than Q1 FY2026's 57.5%. The quarterly gross margin trend shows the compression: 57.5% (Q1 FY2026), 57.8% (Q2 FY2026), 55.9% (Q3 FY2026), 55.3% (Q1 FY2027), per the primary 10-Q filings. The China diversification is real - "a majority of our Drinkware manufacturing capacity is now outside of China" - but the transition lag means YETI is paying tariff costs on a supply chain it is actively dismantling. Source: 10-K FY2026; 10-Q Q1 FY2027.

3. SG&A is outrunning revenue, and the P&L is compressing from both ends. SG&A grew 5% ($41.2M) to $859.1M in FY2026, rising 130 bps to 46.0% of net sales while revenue grew only 2.1%. Operating income fell from $245.4M in FY2025 to $213.6M in FY2026 - a 13% decline in operating income on a 2% increase in revenue. The 10-K risk factor is direct: "Operating retail stores incurs substantial fixed costs and if we are unable to generate sales, operate our retail stores profitably, or otherwise fail to meet expectations, we may be unable to reduce such fixed costs and avoid losses or negative cash flows." New CFO Scott Bomar (joined February 23, 2026, from Home Depot) comes with a consumer-retail finance background that suggests cost discipline is the mandate; but the SG&A problem was already baked into the year he inherited. Source: 10-K FY2026 MD&A.

4. Buybacks at 1.8x net income are masking an EPS story that is weakening at the operating level. YETI repurchased $200M in FY2025 and $297.6M in FY2026 - $497M across two years. Net income declined: $175.7M in FY2025 to $165.4M in FY2026. Diluted EPS went from $2.05 (FY2025) to $2.03 (FY2026) - essentially flat, supported by a share count that fell from 82.9M to approximately 75M shares. The math: roughly half of any FY2026 EPS stability came from share-count reduction, not operating execution. The Board authorized an additional $348M in May 2026, suggesting this pace continues. A CFO reading the YETI 10-K should split EPS into operating-driven versus buyback-driven components - the operating component is declining. Source: 10-K FY2026; 10-Q Q1 FY2027 (shares outstanding 75.7M at April 4, 2026).

Section 5 - Opportunities and threats

The opportunity case is cleaner on the international side than on the domestic side, which is a meaningful reversal from how YETI told its story three years ago.

International is the most structurally sound growth vector remaining. $394.4M in FY2026 at 21% of net sales, with Japan newly launched and the company signaling expansion toward Korea and China e-commerce in FY2027. International growth in FY2025 and FY2026 was broad-based across every region - not a single-market blip. International margins are lower than US DTC (higher freight, some pricing concessions in new markets) but the underlying demand is uncontested, and international products face a different tariff calculus than imports to the US.

Coolers and Equipment is growing where Drinkware is not. C&E grew +7% in FY2026 and +11% in Q1 FY2027, led by bags, soft coolers, and cargo. Mystery Ranch backpacks launched in FY2025 with the Bozeman pack and expand the brand's footprint into load-bearing carry - a different product physics than a tumbler and a category with less direct competition. Helimix (acquired Q3 FY2025 for $38M) enabled the Yonder Shaker Bottle launch in Q4 FY2025, pointing toward health-and-wellness adjacency. These are bolt-on plays, not transformational bets, but they add revenue at a point where the hero drinkware category is stalling.

The threat layer is sharper than the opportunity layer on two dimensions.

Drinkware category maturity and competitive intensity are the structural ceiling. Stanley (estimated $750M revenue in 2023), Owala, RTIC, and Hydro Flask are all fighting for the same premium-to-mid-range shelf space. RTIC launched a redesigned drinkware line in October 2024 - directly coincident with YETI's FY2025 US Drinkware decline. The 10-K language is candid about the dynamic: "our business depends on maintaining and strengthening our brand to attract new customers and generating and maintaining ongoing demand for our products, and a significant reduction in such demand could harm our results of operations." At a $36.6B global market estimate, the addressable category is large - but YETI's US unit has likely penetrated its natural customer base deeply enough that incremental growth requires either price-down (margin-dilutive) or new-occasion creation.

Tariff policy is the wildcard that no supply-chain pivot fully resolves. The FY2026 10-K contains the strongest tariff risk language in the company's history, including reference to the US Supreme Court's IEEPA Decision of February 20, 2026, which invalidated some tariffs but was immediately followed by replacement tariffs. Management's conclusion: "The ultimate impact on our business and results of operations is uncertain but could continue to be material or worsen." Even with Drinkware manufacturing now majority-outside-China, YETI still imports goods from multiple countries subject to tariff regimes; and the Hopper soft cooler (a core C&E line) was historically manufactured in China.

Section 6 - The macro environment

YETI is flying through three macro forces simultaneously, and two of them are working against the business right now.

Premium consumer discretionary is the structural tailwind that built YETI's revenue base from $1.09B to $1.87B over five years. Outdoor participation grew through the COVID era and, while it normalized post-pandemic, it did not reverse. The ambassador-driven aspiration model - fishing guides, hunting outfitters, BBQ competitors, rodeo cowboys - gave YETI a cultural authenticity that a price-down competitor cannot buy. That structural demand has not changed. What has changed is that the target consumer is also shopping Stanley, Owala, and RTIC, and the drinkware category has become promotional enough that YETI can no longer grow US volumes at historical rates without competing on price.

US trade policy is the macro force with the most direct and quantified financial impact. Tariffs added 230 bps of gross margin headwind in FY2026 and are tracking to 280 bps in Q1 FY2027. The IEEPA tariff on Chinese goods - the primary lever - drove YETI to accelerate its manufacturing exit from China in a year when it was already managing post-Hopper recall supply-chain complexity. The two-year supply chain transition period is not free: the pivot created inventory constraints that showed up as US Drinkware decline. If tariff rates stabilize, the China-exit pays off in structurally lower tariff exposure by FY2028. If they escalate further across additional manufacturing countries (Vietnam, Philippines, other Asian suppliers), the pivot may not fully resolve the problem.

Consumer spending trends on discretionary durables are the ambient headwind. The 10-K acknowledges it directly: "We experienced a challenging macroeconomic and consumer spending environment in 2025 that adversely impacted our results of operations." Premium-priced coolers and drinkware are the kind of durable that consumers delay in a tightening environment - not because they switch brands, but because they wait a quarter on a product they already own. YETI's DTC skew (60% of sales) means the company sees that consumer hesitation directly in its own channel metrics rather than filtering through a wholesale buyer's order flow.

The FX overlay on the international business adds a third variable. The 10-K estimates a hypothetical 10% FX move generates approximately $10.6M in unrealized losses. With international at 21% of net sales and growing, a strong US dollar is the quiet margin drag that does not show up in the tariff bridge but runs alongside it.

Section 7 - The CFO verdict and the operator bridge

Here is the read on YETI from a CFO's vantage point.

The brand is real and the pricing power is real. A 57.4% gross margin in a category where the nearest public-company comparable runs negative operating margins is not an accident - it is the compounded result of a decade of ambassador marketing, product quality investment, and distribution discipline. YETI did not discount itself into category leadership. The Hopper recall in calendar 2022 proved the point in reverse: the $128.9M operating income hit came from a reserve and redesign cost, not from consumers abandoning the brand. The business held its pricing through the worst single operational event in its history.

The problem is what is sitting on top of that moat right now. The tariff headwind on China-manufactured Drinkware is not a one-quarter story - it is a multi-year structural cost that is deepening as we write this. The FY2026 10-K describes the supply-chain pivot in language that is notably candid: the accelerated diversification "caused short-term supply chain disruptions in 2025, which impacted our ability to source certain products" - and those disruptions produced the first US Drinkware revenue decline in company history. The supply-chain fix created a demand problem. That is the core tension in the FY2026 financial story.

The international business is the clearest bright spot in the filing. +31% in FY2025, +16% in FY2026, Japan launching, Korea and China e-commerce signaled - and the US is declining. YETI is becoming a more international company faster than it planned, driven by US category maturity rather than deliberate pivot. That is fine as long as international margins hold; the 10-K risk factors flag FX exposure but not a structural margin gap between geographies.

The buyback math is the one number that a CFO reviewing this 10-K should isolate immediately. $497M in buybacks over FY2025-FY2026 against $341M of combined net income over the same two years. The board is returning capital at a rate that exceeds earnings. That works while the balance sheet has the cash buffer - and it does. It stops working if operating cash flow deteriorates materially or if the tariff headwind requires meaningful manufacturing capital reinvestment. The $348M additional buyback authorization approved in May 2026 suggests the board is betting on operating recovery, not on a restructuring. A CFO who disagrees with that bet should be watching Q3 and Q4 FY2027 for whether the China-exit delivers the gross margin restoration that management's guidance implies.

As we explored in our Hims & Hers teardown and our Vital Farms teardown, the test of a premium brand is not what happens in the good years - it is whether the structural advantage that earns the premium is something you built or something that was lent to you. YETI built its premium. The question for FY2027 is whether the manufacturing platform that delivers it is back under control, or whether it is still a policy hostage.

The operator bridge. Your $5-80M DTC or outdoor brand very likely has a version of the YETI pattern in miniature. The tell is this: your gross margin depends on a supply chain decision that was made when conditions were different - a single factory, a single country, a single sourcing partner. That decision looked irrelevant when tariffs were stable. It became your biggest operating risk the quarter policy changed.

I have seen this in client work where a brand's 50-60% gross margin was structurally dependent on a specific manufacturing partner in a specific country. When that country's import-duty profile changed, the brand was facing a multi-year supply-chain rebuild timed exactly when the business needed margin stability to fund growth. The early warning - the signal that was available in the numbers twelve months before the crisis - was not in revenue. It was in three places: the risk-factor language in the annual report (where YETI's FY2025 10-K first flagged tariff exposure explicitly, a year before it became the dominant P&L variable); the geography of inventory on the balance sheet (concentrated in countries subject to escalating policy risk); and the gross margin bridge in the MD&A (where a single line item starts absorbing more than 100% of the year's margin deterioration).

Early-warning scorecard - five lines that catch this 12 months early:

1. The gross margin bridge, single-line dominance: when one variable (freight, tariffs, recall reserves) absorbs more than 100% of the annual gross margin change, every other positive driver is fighting one negative. That concentration of margin risk is visible in the MD&A before it hits the P&L in full.
2. Risk-factor language year-over-year: compare the tariff/trade section in last year's 10-K to this year's. YETI's FY2024 10-K had limited tariff language. FY2025's had material escalation. FY2026's had the strongest language in the company's history. The risk section is where management tells you what they are actually worried about; read it as a signal, not boilerplate.
3. SG&A growth versus revenue growth: when SG&A is growing 5% in a year revenue grows 2%, the P&L is compressing from the cost side at the same time the gross margin is compressing from tariffs. You can sustain this for one year during an investment cycle; sustaining it for two consecutive years is a cost-structure signal, not a growth signal.
4. Buyback spend versus net income: when buybacks exceed net income for a sustained period, the EPS stability you see in the 10-K is partly mechanical share-count reduction rather than operating improvement. Build a version of EPS that holds share count constant - if that version is declining, the operating story is weaker than the headline number shows.
5. Channel concentration within DTC: YETI's 10-K specifically flags Amazon as a concentration risk ("any adverse change in our relationship with Amazon...could adversely affect our continued DTC channel growth"). Within your DTC channel, find the single platform or partner generating 25%+ of DTC revenue - the organic growth rate of that specific platform, not the channel aggregate, is the real leading indicator.

If you want to run this scorecard against your own numbers before you reach a quarter where tariffs, supply-chain disruption, and SG&A decay all show up simultaneously, that is a fractional CFO conversation. The analysis takes a few hours. The cost of not doing it arrives in the annual report where a single risk factor becomes the dominant variable in your margin bridge.

Sources and methodology

SEC EDGAR is the primary source for every financial figure in this post. YETI Holdings, Inc. (CIK 0001670592) files on SEC EDGAR. Specific filings used: 10-K FY2026 (fiscal year ended January 3, 2026, filed 2026-02-27, accession 0001670592-26-000013); 10-Q Q1 FY2027 (quarter ended April 4, 2026, filed 2026-05-14, accession 0001670592-26-000028); 10-K FY2025 (fiscal year ended December 28, 2024, filed 2025-02-24, accession 0001670592-25-000008); 10-K FY2024 (fiscal year ended December 30, 2023, filed 2024-02-26, accession 0001670592-24-000007). Revenue, gross margin, operating income, net income, SG&A, channel and product mix, cash, debt, share count, and balance sheet figures are taken directly from the XBRL financial statements in these filings or from the MD&A gross margin bridges (which are audited narrative disclosure).

YETI's fiscal year naming convention: YETI's fiscal year ends on the Saturday nearest December 31. Their "FY2026" is the 53-week year that ended January 3, 2026 (calendar year 2025 operations). Their "FY2025" ended December 28, 2024 (calendar year 2024). "FY2023" ended December 31, 2022 - the recall year. This post follows YETI's own conventions throughout.

The $128.9M recall figure is verbatim from the 10-K FY2024 Note disclosures: "the total unfavorable impact of the proposed voluntary recalls to operating income was $128.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2022." The gross margin collapse in FY2023 (47.9%) is from the EDGAR XBRL data - sourced to the FY2024 comparative period reporting.

Our research provided business model narrative, competitive context (Newell O&R margin, RTIC/Stanley competitive landscape, drinkware market size estimate of $36.6B), verbatim risk-factor language pulled from the 10-K FY2026, and competitive context. The quarterly gross margin series in the body is taken from the primary 10-Q filings (57.5% Q1 FY2026, 57.8% Q2 FY2026, 55.9% Q3 FY2026, 55.3% Q1 FY2027). Where claims were sourced to primary filings, they are used; where they could not be traced to a primary source, they were excluded.

The Newell O&R operating margin comparison (-14.1% reported in Q4 FY2025) is sourced from Newell Brands Q4 FY2025 results. This is an operating margin figure (not gross margin) and is not directly comparable to YETI's gross margin; it is included as directional context for the premium-brand differential, not as a basis-point peer comparison.

The $66.5M IEEPA tariff estimate for FY2027 is sourced to YETI management disclosure in investor relations materials. It should be treated as a management estimate, not an audited figure.

Stanley's $750M estimated revenue is a third-party estimate and is not derived from an SEC filing (Stanley is private). It is included as competitive context, not a financial fact.

The drinkware market size estimate of $36.6B is from a third-party source. It is included as macro context and has not been independently verified against a primary source.

Social signal is colour only. The three TikTok embeds in Section 2 are from the drinkware/bottle-culture category and carry no financial claim. @sacredhearts11 (954.9K plays), @rachael_h99 (1.5M plays, 63.9K likes), and @hydraulicforce1511 (807.4K plays) were selected as illustrative of the YETI-vs-Stanley/bottle-culture landscape. They are not evidence of any revenue or margin figure.

Limitations. YETI does not break out gross margin by channel (DTC versus wholesale) in its public filings - only the narrative statement that DTC "generally generates higher gross margin." The Helimix acquisition price ($38M) is sourced to our analysis of the 10-K FY2026, not independently verified to a specific filing note. Mystery Ranch and Butter Pat acquisition prices were not publicly disclosed. This post reflects filings and disclosures current through June 23, 2026.

Frequently asked questions

is YETI Holdings profitable?

Yes - YETI posted $165.4M net income on $1,868.5M revenue in FY2026 (ended January 3, 2026), an 8.9% net margin, and $254.7M in operating cash flow. The balance sheet is net-cash ($188.3M cash, $73.8M term loan, $300M revolver undrawn). The concern is compression: operating margin fell from 13.4% in FY2025 to 11.4% in FY2026, driven by 230 basis points of tariff headwind on gross margin and SG&A growing faster than revenue. Q1 FY2027 shows further compression, with operating margin at 3.3% - consistent with seasonal patterns but also reflecting the tariff trajectory.

what was the YETI Hopper recall and how much did it cost?

In January 2023, YETI issued a voluntary recall of its Hopper M30, M20, and SideKick Dry soft coolers. The 10-K FY2024 states verbatim that "the total unfavorable impact of the proposed voluntary recalls to operating income was $128.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2022." That single hit cratered FY2023 gross margin (calendar year 2022) to 47.9%, a nearly 10-point collapse. Redesigned Hopper M Series products launched Q4 2023. A recall reserve of $12.1M remained as of December 28, 2024.

how does YETI make money - DTC vs wholesale?

YETI operates two channels. DTC (60% of FY2026 net sales, $1,127.8M) encompasses YETI.com, 27 US retail stores, and Amazon Marketplace. Wholesale (40%, $740.7M) serves Dick's Sporting Goods, REI, Academy, Bass Pro Shops, Ace Hardware, and international retail partners. The 10-K states DTC "generally generates higher gross margin than our wholesale channel due to differentiated pricing between these channels." Within DTC, Amazon Marketplace has been the primary growth driver, which the company flags as a concentration risk.

how much did tariffs cost YETI in FY2026?

YETI's 10-K FY2026 states tariffs "unfavorably impacted gross margin by 230 basis points." On $1,868.5M in revenue, that is approximately $43M of incremental cost in one year. YETI estimates paying approximately $66.5M in IEEPA tariffs in the following fiscal year (FY2027). Q1 FY2027 already shows 280 bps of gross margin headwind from tariffs, driving gross margin to 55.3% - 215 bps below Q1 FY2026's 57.5%.

why did YETI's US Drinkware revenue decline in FY2026?

Three factors hit simultaneously: a promotional competitive environment from Stanley, Owala, RTIC, and Hydro Flask; cautious wholesale ordering from retail partners reducing inventory positions; and supply-chain disruptions from YETI's accelerated exit from China Drinkware manufacturing, which constrained its ability to fulfill certain SKUs. Management's verbatim 10-K language: "reflecting a promotional market environment, a cautious wholesale buying environment, and inventory constraints driven by our supply chain transition."

what is YETI's international revenue and growth rate?

International net sales were $394.4M in FY2026 (ended January 3, 2026), 21% of total net sales, up from 19% in FY2025 and 16% in FY2024. International grew +16% in FY2026 and +31% in FY2025. YETI distributes across Canada, Australia, New Zealand, UK, Europe (Netherlands, Germany), and Japan (launched Q2 2025). All international regions grew in FY2026 while total US revenue declined 1% YoY.

does YETI have debt?

Minimal debt. As of January 3, 2026: $188.3M cash, $73.8M total debt (single Term Loan A, maturing June 2028, ~6.11% weighted-average interest rate in FY2025), net cash position $114.9M. The $300M revolving credit facility was fully undrawn. YETI absorbed $297.6M in buybacks against $254.7M of operating cash flow in FY2026 without drawing the revolver.

who are YETI's main competitors?

In hard coolers: Pelican (private) and RTIC (private, priced 20-40% cheaper). In drinkware: Stanley (estimated $750M in 2023 revenue), Owala, Hydro Flask (Newell Brands), and RTIC. Newell Brands' Outdoor and Recreation segment - Coleman, Contigo - is the closest public-company peer and posted a negative reported operating margin in Q4 FY2025, against YETI's 11.4% full-year operating margin in FY2026. The total drinkware market is estimated at $36.6B globally in 2025.